

Foreign Policy of Nepal: Diplomatic Relations With China

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ABSTRACT

The study article “Foreign Policy of Nepal: Diplomatic Relationship with China” offers a critical examination in the domain of International Relations, concentrating on Nepal’s foreign policy and its diplomatic relations with China. It looks at how bilateral relations work and the different types of diplomatic understanding that affect how countries act in politics around the world. The research seeks to cultivate an International Relations viewpoint grounded in the tenets of foreign policy and diplomacy, providing elucidation on regional and global political frameworks. China’s role is highlighted as a significant influence on Nepal’s foreign policy direction and international relations. The study employs a descriptive research methodology, utilizing secondary data sourced from academic publications, journal articles, official reports, and policy papers pertaining to foreign policy, diplomacy, and international relations. It examines significant elements, including political, economic, military, cultural, and religious relations, as well as the dynamics of power exchange, conflict, and collaboration between Nepal and China. The study also shows how the roles of state actors are changing and how Nepal’s foreign policy is becoming more flexible in dealing with political problems at home and abroad.

Keywords: diplomatic relations, foreign policy, international politics, international relations

Introduction

The diplomatic relationship in the midst of Nepal and China is principally formed by the Sino-Nepalese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which was signed on April 28, 1960 by China’s Premier Chou En-Lai and Nepal’s first elected Prime Minister B.P Koirala (Sharma, 2018, p. 443). On August 1, 1955, China and Nepal established diplomatic ties. A year later, they signed the Agreement on Maintaining Friendly Relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Kingdom of Nepal (GoN) and the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and Nepal. On Premier Zhou’s invitation,

Prime Minister Tanka Prasad Acharya made the first official visit to China from September 26 to October 7, 1956, during the visit; agreement was signed on China providing economic aid to Nepal (Bhasin, 1994, p.153).

Primarily, Nepal exhibited a careful approach towards China; however, recent efforts have been to boost trade and connectivity. ‘A considerable milestone in their relations occurred with the resolution of border disputes through the Sino-Nepal boundary agreement on March 21, 1960, which is to be found Nepal as the first neighboring country to formalize a border treaty with China. This treaty was ratified by both governments on



October 5, 1961. Since May 16, 1975, following the assimilation of Sikkim into India' ([Mulmi, 2019](#)) has pursued a strategy of balancing the influences of its two neighbors, China and India. 'The age old and deep rooted relations in the core of these two nations always remained friendly and cordial. The historic and multifaceted relations have evolved since the days of Nepali Monk and Scholar Budhhabhadra (early 5th Century), Princess Bhrikuti (first half of the 7th Century) and Arniko (Anige, second half of the 13th Century) and early visits of Chinese monks and scholars like Monk Fa Xian (Jin Dynasty), Monk Xuan Zang (Tang Dynasty) among other' (MoFA, 2025).

Research article on "Foreign Policy of Nepal: Diplomatic Relationship with China" centers on a descriptive analysis on IR, specially examining the dynamics of foreign policy and diplomatic relationship based on bilateral relations and various forms of diplomatic understanding. This research article aims to develop an IR dynamics rooted in the principles of foreign policy and diplomacy, providing a foundational understanding of international structures and international politics. The role of China gives emphasis to the reflection in the foreign policy and various diplomatic understanding among the nations. These two nations share a 1414 kilometers border in the northern Himalayan region, The boundary business between the two countries starting from the boundary delimitation agreement to boundary treaty, demarcation of pillars, preparation of strip-maps and signing on the boundary protocol have been completed within a short span of time. Article 1(1) and (2) of the agreement between China and Nepal ratify in the border Treaty in 1960 by the Prime Minister B.P Koirala.

The border runs along the entire northern perimeter of Nepal, with its easternmost point situated in the Taplejung district, where it meets China and India. Conversely, the westernmost point is marked by the tri-junction of China and India in the Limpiyadhura area, near the primarily root source of the Mahakaili River according to the

1816 Treaty of Sugauli, while 'Nepal is locked by India on three sides, resulting in a total territorial length of 1751 kilometers' ([Dahal, 2019](#)). The border, which traverses varied landscapes from the Himalayas to the Indo-Gangetic Plain, was defined by the Treaty of Sugauli 1816 between Kingdom of Nepal and Southern Sea.

The Kali River, originating in Limpiyadhura is a focal point of contention as contemporary Republican Nepal claims the entire River and its source, while India has maintained control over the Kalapani area, including the Lipulekh Pass till the date of research study. This situation has led to a complex territorial dispute, with Nepal asserting its claims based on historical maps and the Treaty of Sugauli, while India argues that the River's source lies in a different tributary. China's role in this dispute is primarily through its agreements with India regarding trade and pilgrimage routes that utilize the Lipulekh Pass, which the Himalayan state, "Nepal" perceives as an endorsement of India's claims, thereby complicating the bilateral dispute into a trilateral issue involving all three nations. Simultaneously, 'Nepal is steadfast in its adherence to the 'One China Policy' and is dedicated to ensuring that its territory is not utilized for any activities that could be perceived as hostile towards China. China has also supported Nepal's proposal to declare Nepal as "Zone of Peace" on February 25, 1975 and has never interfered with the internal affairs of Nepal and highly respected the road of development chosen by Nepalese people' ([Dahal, 2019, p. 86](#)).

Problem Statement

Nepal's foreign policy, particularly its diplomatic relations with China, faces critical challenges amid economic vulnerabilities and uneven regional development. While remittances bolster rural livelihoods in areas like Tilottama, Rupandehi ([Adhikari et al., 2024](#)), they mask deeper dependencies on external aid and trade imbalances with major partners like China, straining sovereignty in infrastructure deals like the Belt and Road Initiative. Compounding this, Madhesh Province grapples with educational deficits that

hinder human capital formation and economic growth (Mishra & Mishra, 2024), limiting Nepal's negotiating power and exposing border regions to geopolitical pressures. This disconnect risks suboptimal policy outcomes, eroding national resilience without balanced diplomacy.

Research Objective

The objective of the research article is to explore the diplomatic relationship of China and Nepal.

Methodology

Researcher explores and analyzed the various variables such as political relations, economic relations, military and exchange of power, religious relations, conflict relationship and collaboration between China and Nepal based on foreign relations of these nations. The source of research article is based on secondary data, viz. the constitution of Nepal 2015, scholarly literatures, various concerned treaties, joint statements of high level official visits etc. the entire research article is based on descriptive and analytical in nature relies on pragmatic philosophy.

Literature Review

Genesis of the Diplomatic Relations: China and Nepal

The guiding concepts, policies, and duties of the Nepal regarding its foreign policy are laid out in the republican [Constitution of Nepal 2015](#). As stated in part four, directive principles, policies and obligations of the State, article 50(4) states that, 'the State shall direct its IR towards enhancing the dignity of the nation in the world community by maintaining IR on the basis of sovereign equality, while safeguarding the freedom, sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence and national interest of Nepal'. Article 51(m) (1), 'policies relating to IR states that, 'to conduct independent foreign policy based on the Charter of the UN, non-alignment, principles of Panchsheel, international law and the norms of world peace, taking into consideration of the overall interest of the nation, while remaining active in safeguarding the

sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and national interest of Nepal' ([Constitution of Nepal, p. 42-43](#)). Foreign policy is an activity of the state with which it fulfills its aims and interests within the international arena ([Petric, 2013, p. 1](#)).

In contemporary political development after the World War II, Nepal till July 17, 2024 maintains diplomatic ties with 183 countries, out of these China and Nepal developed their diplomatic relations on August 1, 1955, ([Bhasain, 1994, P. 15](#)), which has been completed seventy years of its celebration of diplomatic tied. Historically, Nepal and China have a long-standing friendship, dating back to the early 5th century AD (p.79).

Nepal is of much strategic weight to China, while it would not be stress-free to handle Nepal's neighbor policy if they were guided by narrow-minded interests, meaning that Nepal's prosperity depends much on astute management of and balance in its neighboring policy ([Rose, 1971, p. 87](#)) which ranked as the fifth diplomatic friendly country followed by Nepal-France on April 20, 1949, Nepal- India on June 13, 1947, Nepal-USA on 23 April, 1947 and formal relations of Nepal with the UK began in 1816 ([MoFA,2025](#)). The relations between these nations have been marked by friendliness, understanding, mutual support, cooperation and respect for each other's aspirations and sensitivities. Both the nations have relentless faith on the ideals of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence ([MoFA, 2025; Sharma, 2018, p. 442](#)). States articulate their national interests through foreign policy strategies ([Kissinger, 1994](#)), diplomatic channels such as embassies, consulates, and direct dialogues ([Holste, 1995](#)), as well as multilateral diplomatic platforms. Institutions like the UN provide states with a forum to advocate for their interests while navigating international pressures and expectations ([Keohane & Nye, 1977](#)). Such institutions foster cooperation by enabling states to pursue shared objectives and form coalitions based on common interests ([Keohane, 1984](#)).

Nepal's connection with Tibet is now largely shaped by its ties with China, with the Consulate General of Nepal in Lhasa acting as the primary diplomatic representation in the region. Historically, relations between Nepal and Tibet were marked by a unique blend of trade and conflict, overseen by early institutions such as the 'Jaishi Kotha,' which later evolved into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, focusing on foreign relations with Tibet and China. In contemporary moment, despite the enduring cultural and religious bonds, diplomatic and political engagements are predominantly conducted through Nepal's broader relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Consulate General in Lhasa stands as the sole diplomatic mission in the Tibet Autonomous Region, while trade has flourished through land routes like Rasuwagadhi and Tatopani. Additionally, the influx of Chinese tourists to Nepal has surged aided by direct flights from Lhasa and other cities, further enhancing cultural exchanges facilitated by the Consulate General.

The historical background of Nepal's foreign relations began with the establishment of the Jaishi Kotha in 1769, following the unification of Nepal. This institution primarily focused on managing diplomatic ties with Tibet and China. The relationship between Nepal and Tibet has been characterized by a blend of extensive trade and intermittent conflicts, often arising from disputes over trade routes and currency. A significant milestone in this context was the Kantipur-Tibet Treaty of 1856 which is also known as the Treaty of Thapathali. This treaty which was a peace treaty signed on March 24, 1856, after the Nepal-Tibet War of 1855-1856. This facilitated trade privileges for Nepalese merchants and encouraged their settlements throughout Tibet.

In contemporary political dilemma the exile of Dalai Lama from Tibet plays a historical significant political change in the northern region along with China.

In contemporary political dilemma the exile of Dalai Lama from Tibet plays a political

significant change in the northern region along with China. This is very crucial in respect to the foreign relations and foreign policy of Nepal. It has been an ongoing debate in the western political regime in its recognition till the date. Simultaneously, on March 10, 1959, early 1960s the Nepal allocated land with the help of international agencies established the first temporary settlements e.g. Chialsa (in Soukhumbu), Tashi Palkhel, Dhorpatan and Samdupling (Jawalakhel). In 1962, Tashi Palkhel was established in Pokhara, one of the first and oldest settlements and nearby area like Jampaling (Lodrik) in Tanahu district which is approximately 25 kilometers from Pokhara. In 1964, Tashi-Ling settlement was established with UN assistance. Similarly, 'Choejor i.e. Chorten and Khampa Camp in Jorpati in Kathamndu district, Delekling Camp in Solukhumbu, Dorpattan Camp in Baglung, Gyegayling, Dunche Camp in Rasuwa, Jampaling (Lodrik) in Tanahu district, Lumbini, Kapilbastu, Namgyeling, Camp in Chirok, Mustang, Norziling (Baglung), Phakshing and Galsa or Gyalsa Camp, Samdupling, Jawalakhel Camp in Lalitpur, Tashiling, and Paljorling in Pokhara Area, Jampaling, Camp in Lodrik, Pokhara, Paljorling, Camp in Lodrik, Pokhara, Tashi Palkhiel, Pokhara Camp, Tashiling, Pokhara Camp, in Kaski, Sampheling (Taplejung), Walung Camp. Walung serves as the primary settlement for the Walung people also known as Walung-ngas or walungpa, an indigenous ethnic group of Tibetan heritage. Walungpa has inhabited in the isolated Olangchung Gola region elevation of approximately 3200 meters in the Taplejung District, it lies close to the Tibetan border. In 1989, GoN stopped issuing refugee ID cards to new arrivals under pressure from PRC government, changing the legal status of subsequent refugee. Currently, there are twelve Tibetan refugee Camps in Nepal, each supervised by a representative appointed by the Central Tibetan Administration (Refugees in Nepal, 2016)' (Shahi, 2018, p. 74).

Nepal faces challenges related to its substantial Tibetan refugee population, which complicates its diplomatic relations with PRC

government. Additionally, Nepal has expressed concerns regarding trade issues linked to Tibet, raising grievances with PRC officials to address these ongoing complexities.

During Nepal's unification, 'its relationship with Tibet was largely focused on trade, economic influence and regional power dynamics, culminating in the Sino-Nepalese War of 1788-1792 and the establishment of a tributary relationship with China's Qing Dynasty' (Pokharel, 2025, p.94). Under King Prithvi Narayan Shah administration recognized the critical importance of controlling trans-Himalayan trade routes, strategically capturing key locations such as Nuwakot to impose economic pressure on the Malla Kingdom of the Kathmandu Valley, which included provisions for joint trade with Tibet, underscoring the significance of Tibetan trade in Nepal's internal politics and unification efforts. Furthermore, Shah adopted a cautious approach towards Tibet, mindful of its powerful protector, the Qing Dynasty, and aimed to maintain amicable relations with both northern bloc and the Southern sea. He further posits Nepal as a buffer state or the "Yam between two boulders" between these two formidable powers (GoN, *Dibya Upadesh*).

The Sino-Nepalese War and its aftermath following the death of Prithvi Narayan Shah in January 11, 1775 at the age of fifty-two, his successor Bahadur Shah adopted a more aggressive expansionist stance, which ultimately led to tensions with Tibet. The conflict arose primarily from a significant trade dispute regarding the quality of Nepalese silver coins in circulation in Tibet. 'The mistreatment of Nepalese merchants in Lhasa and the tenth Shamarpa Lama, Mipam Chodrup Gyamsto, sought refuge in Nepal in 1788 after escaping political and religious persecution in Tibet. His flight was a pivotal event that contributed to the outbreak of the Sino-Nepalese War from 1788-1792. He spent the rest of his life in Nepal and died in 1792' (Rose 1971, p. 130).

'In 1788, Nepalese forces invaded Tibet, initially achieving success and compelling the Tibetans to sign the Treaty of Kerung on June

2, 1789, which mandated an annual tribute to Nepal. However, Tibet's refusal to pay led to a second invasion in 1791, prompting Tibet to seek assistance from the Qianlong Emperor of China. In response, a substantial Qing army, commanded by General Fuk'anggan, was dispatched to drive back the Nepalese forces' (Pokharel, 2025, p. 101). The ensuing conflict culminated in the Treaty of Betrawati in October 2, 1792, which not only concluded hostilities but also established a tributary relationship between Nepal and China, requiring Nepal to send tribute missions to the Qing court every five years (p.94). According to the article 4 of the Treaty of Betrawati, it confirms that any external threat against Nepalese Sovereignty would be defended by Chinese military assistance (Manandhar, 2003, p. 130). The war and its consequences considerably influenced Nepal's unification efforts, as control over trade routes with Tibet became a fundamental economic driver for Gorkhali/Nepalese expansion, while the treaty helped delineate Nepal's northern border and fostered diplomatic relations with the formidable Qing Empire. Thus, the conflict compelled the newly unified Nepal to establish a clear foreign policy, navigating the complexities of its relationships with its significant northern bloc and its southern counterpart the southern sea. This accord laid the groundwork for a structural diplomatic relationship that would endure for over a century, significantly influencing regional trade dynamics and military strategies.

The effect of World War II marked a significant shift in international politics and foreign policy dynamics, particularly following the decline of northern imperialism and the formidable Southern sea. This transformation is mirrored in the political landscape of the region, especially after the fall of the Rana regime in 1951.

'The Himalayan region serving as a buffer zone, remains delicate, encompassing the independent states of Bhutan, Ladakh (Jammu and Kashmir), Nepal, Sikkim, and the North East frontier agency, PRC asserts that, these territory, which it refers to as South Tibet or Zangnan is part

of Tibet, specifically encompassing what is now Arunachal Pradesh in India' (Adhikari, 2024, p. 87). Simultaneously, the formal annexation of Tibet by China occurred in 1951 with the signing of the Seventeen Pointed Agreement, following the entry of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) into the region and the defeat of the Tibetan military in 1950. 'Key developments included the PLA's incarceration of Chamdo in October 7, 1950, which compelled the Tibetan government to enter negotiation. On May 23, 1951, under significant pressure, Tibetan representatives signed the agreement in Beijing recognizing China's sovereignty over Tibet' (Apil, 2016, p.226-241). The fourteenth Dalai Lama ratified this agreement in October 24, 1951, after which the PLA moved into Lhasa the capital of Tibet. Although the agreement initially granted some autonomy to the Tibetan government, this arrangement deteriorated, culminating in the 1959 Tibetan uprising. Following the uprising, the Dalai Lama sought refuge in Dharmashala, India and the Chinese government dissolved the local Tibetan government in exile and its supporters view them as an invasion and occupation of a sovereign nation.

Thus, 'concept attributed by Mao Zedong has promptly developed the "Palm and Five Fingers Strategic Policy", in which the five fingers of Tibet, refers to a territorial claim by contemporary PRC regarding the Himalayan region adjacent to India. This notion depicts Tibet as the palm of China's hand, with five regions as Bhutan, Ladakh the North-East part of Jammu and Kashmir, Nepal, Sikkim, and the North East Frontier Agency (now Arunachal Pradesh) represented as fingers that China responsible for liberating' (Singh, 2014; Baral, 2021, p. 43) Although this policy has not been officially acknowledged in public statements by the PRC government and is currently viewed as inactive, there are ongoing concerns about its potential resurgence or continued relevance in geopolitical discussions in contemporary international politics and international relations. It has been crucial for foreign policy and diplomacy of Nepal in her international political landscape

issues how it represent in international political system.

Imperial China asserted its suzerainty over Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim as part of its broader claim over Tibet. In 1908, the Chinese ambassador in Tibet communicated with Nepalese officials, emphasizing the need for cooperation between Nepal and Tibet under China's guidance (Basnyat, 2023), which Mao Zedong symbolically represented through the "blending of five colors" to reinforce Chinese influence amid British resistance. Furthermore, on November 15, 1939, Mao, the founding Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, referred to Bhutan and Nepal as tributary states of China. The imperialist nations, having inflicted military defeats on China, forcibly annexed several territories that were historically tributary to the Chinese empire, including Korea, Taiwan and parts of Southeast Asia, while also imposing substantial indemnities on China, thereby delivering significant blows to its feudal structure. After the communist takeover of China and subsequent invasion of Tibet leading to the Himalayan region becoming geopolitically more volatile, things began falling apart. The degree of geopolitical volatility reached its peak when the idea of the Himalayan Confederation or Confederation of Himalayan States was played out (Patterson, 1970; Mishra & Ottaway, 2018).

Relevant Theories

Realism

Realism emphasizes the anarchic nature of the international system, where states prioritize their survival and power, giving military powers and national interest paramount importance (Morgenthau, 1948). Nepal had been following realist principles since beginning to strategically allocate herself and maintain balanced relationships with her northern empire and southern sea, as Prithvi Narayan Shah described it as "a yam between two boulders" (Dibya Upadesh, para 5, p. 5). 'Nepal's approach in foreign relations has been more cautious post-Sugauli Treaty in the aftermath of the Anglo-Nepali War (Atique,

1983; Rose, 1971). The realist perspective stresses that Nepal needs to maintain a strong defense and security against potential threats from her neighbors. This is apparent in historical conflicts and ongoing territorial disputes' (Bastola, 2025, P. 239). Realism emphasizes the importance of power dynamics and national interests in the context of China-Nepal diplomatic relations. This perspective highlights how both nations navigate their interaction based on strategic considerations, such as economic cooperation and security concerns, often prioritizing their sovereignty and regional influence over ideology alignments.

Liberalism

It focuses on the importance of international cooperation, institutions, and economic interdependence. It highlights that achievement of security is possible through collaboration rather than conflicts (Keohane & Nye, 1977). Nepal has been following liberal principles with engagement in regional organizations such as SAARC, SCO, BEMISTIC, BBIN, Economic Corridors etc. as well as international forums (UN). These dealings are a sign of an obligation to multilateralism and cooperative security protocols. Thus, 'King Mahendra established diplomatic relations with both the neighbors from southern and the northern bloc along with the Most Favored Nations (MFN) of northern hemisphere during his reign, demonstrating a shift towards foreign policy of Nepal and economic diplomacy to strengthen national security through interdependence' (Brown, 1996). In the year 1984, 'the Finance Minister of Nepal, Prakash Chandra Lohani initiated the process of financial liberalization. Later on, liberalism stressed strengthening economic ties through trade and transit treaty of Nepal with diverse diplomatic friendly nations, improving national security and reducing dependency on a single country' (MoFA, 2025). Liberalism, on the other hand, focuses on the role of international institutions and interdependence in shaping China-Nepal relations. This theory suggests that through diplomatic engagement, trade agreements and

cultural exchanges both nations can foster mutual benefits and stability, ultimately promoting peace and collaboration in the region.

Constructivism

The IR scholars of Constructivism, 'centralizes how identity, norms and structures of social systems determines state behavior. It implies that historical narratives, cultural factors and domestic politics determine foreign policy' (Wendt, 1992). There is an insinuation of constructivist ideology in the genesis of foreign policy of Nepal, principally on the influence of national identity in political strategies. 'King Birendra proposal for Nepal as a "Zone of Peace" during the NAM summit held in Algiers from September 5 to 9, 1973, exemplifies how identity and normative frameworks shape foreign policy decisions' (Acharya, 2014). This proposal was aimed at establishing landlocked and least developed Nepal as a neutral actor in the regional and multilateral political landscape. It highlights the magnitude of national identity in shaping security policies. Nepal's commitment to non-alignment not only serves Nepal's immediate security needs but also builds state reputation as a peace-oriented nation in the international political arena. 'These theoretical approaches to foreign policy provide valuable insights into the strategies that guide the behavior of a state. Foreign policy of Nepal is shaped by her strategic positioning between the two major powers, which explains her security concerns and focus on maintaining a balanced, neutral stance' (Bastola, 2025, p.239). It offers a valuable lens though which to analyze the diplomatic relations between China and Nepal. This theory emphasizes the role of social constructs, identities and shared understandings in shaping international interactions and foreign policy of Nepal. In the context of China-Nepal relations, it highlights how historical ties, cultural exchanges and mutual perceptions influence diplomatic strategies and policies. The evolving nature of these relations can be understood through the lens of constructivist principles; as both nations navigate their identities and interests within a complex geopolitical landscape. By recognizing the significance of these social dynamics, one

can better appreciate the nuances of cooperation and negotiation that characterize the bilateral engagement.

India Factor in Nepal-China Relations

‘With respect to all of its neighbors, Nepal has taken concrete steps over the past two years to promote goodwill and deep economic and social connectivity with India. But nationalist sentiments in all these countries often directed against India as the region’s predominant power will continue to present a challenge’ (Jaishankar, 2016, Dahal, 2018, p. 49). The dynamics of foreign policy of Nepal are significantly influenced by its relationships with China and India. As Nepal navigates its diplomatic ties, it must carefully balance the historical and cultural connections with India against the growing economic and strategic partnerships with China. This balancing act is crucial, as Nepal seeks to enhance its sovereignty while fostering development through foreign investment and infrastructure projects. The developing relationship with China, characterized by increasing trade and investment, presents both opportunities and challenges for Nepal, particularly in the context of its longstanding ties with India. Eventually, foreign policy of Nepal reflects a strategic approach to leverage its position between these two powerful neighbors, aiming for stability and growth in a multifaceted geopolitical landscape. Simkhada, (2021), on ‘Indo-Nepal Relations, he claims that the problem has arisen due to the over politicization of relations on one side over bureaucratization on the other. His idea of the paradox of proximity, the closer the two countries, the more vital but also complex and sensitive the relationship gives a good cue for both sides in restoring the historically important relations’ (p. 231).

The future of India and Nepal are intensely entangled, the geographical positioning of Nepal nestled on the southern slopes of the Himalayas towards the southern bloc firmly placed to share their cultural and historical ties. However, the past five decades have revealed growing rift, primarily due to a lack of understanding and appreciation

for each other’s perspectives. This disconnect particularly evident in Nepal’s hesitation to engage with India on security. Historical documents indicate misperceptions have taken root over the years, underscoring the need for both nations to undertake confidence building measures, as trust must be cultivated rather than simply negotiated. In contrast, Nepal’s relationship with China, despite geographical closeness, remains more tenuous. It is essential for Nepal to acknowledge these realities and prioritizes its relationship with India over its ties with China (Bhasin, 2005).

China’s efforts to coagulate its influence in Nepal have escalated, particularly as its interests extend beyond the Tibetan issue. Historically, Nepal was perceived as a “near barbarian” state that required oversight to maintain regional stability. However, it has evolved into an important link for China to the broader southern region. The Chinese political thinker on the Nepal and its peripheral region suggested, India’s actions are prompting the northern bloc to reevaluate its approach. Chinese argued Indian’s inability to respect the “strategic autonomy” of its Southern Asian neighbors creates a discord that poses risks to Chinese interest. If India aspires to assert leadership in the region on its size and power, it must do so with the agreement of its smaller counterparts (Upadhyaya, 2012).

The analysis of the Indo-Nepal relationship reveals it as a manifestation of hybrid colonialism, deeply rooted in historical and colonial legacies. This perspective highlights the complexities of their interactions, suggesting that past influences continue to shape contemporary dynamics between the two nations. ‘It highlights the complexities introduced by the emerging triangular relationship with China, which alters the exiting power dynamics between India and Nepal’ (Dahal, 2019), critiques foreign policy of Nepal as ineffective, arguing that it has fostered dependency rather than autonomy and calls for greater accountability among political actors.

Nehru expressed his opinion on the Himalayas as a crucial security frontier for southern bloc during a speech to Parliament of December

5, 1950, the emphasis on the Himalayas as a protective barrier has become a major reference point in discussions about India's foreign policy and border security. He highlighted the necessity of safeguarding this frontier, particularly Himalayan State, warning that any actions that weaken the barrier could threaten southern bloc's security. The frequently cited in academic literature, including works that explore Himalayan State's relations with other powers and collections documenting its interactions with southern and northern blocs from 1949-1966, which feature excerpts from his speech. In addition, the 1950's Treaty of Peace and Friendship between India and Nepal establishes mutual national treatment for citizens, albeit excluding political rights, Southern bloc has consistently regarded Himalayan State as part of its sphere of influence with his asserting that southern bloc's frontier extends to the Himalayas of Himalayan States (Muni, 2016, Poudel, 2024, p. 106). India's engagement in Nepal is so extensive that its influence is evident in nearly all of Nepal's political transformations, including its transition to a federal republic (Adhikari, 2018, Poudel, 2024, p. 106). However, this deep involvement has also fueled anti-Indian sentiments among segments of Nepal's population (Thapa & Acharya, 2020; Poudel, 2024, p. 106).

US Factor in China-Nepal Relations

The scribe characterizes of Nepal as a small nation between two big powers as the revenge of geography (Kaplan, 2013, p. 324). 'The dynamics of time and understanding of space can help transform revenge into reward of Geography. Thus to execute, Nepal needs political actor and diplomatic skill to manage relations with the emerging and current superpowers cooperating and competing at the same time. Internal political division over the US funded MCC project entangled with Foreign policy bringing the US and China face to face over Nepal's handling of the mega project is a clear commentary on Nepal's internal political role affecting its diplomacy' (Simkhada, 2020, p. 231).

Specially, 'after passing of MCC by the House of Representatives, GoN with explanatory

declaration on February 27, 2022, simultaneously the high-level delegates of the US had visited Nepal. In May 2022, some of high-level US officials also visited Tibetan Refugee Camp in Jawalakhel, Lalitpur and Boudha area of Kathmandu valley, which hosts the significant Tibetan refugees. During the visit, the official engaged with community leaders and residents to discuss their living conditions and concerns. Such meeting took place despite the Nepali MoFA claiming they were unaware of such plans, leading to reactions from Beijing regarding Nepal's adherence to the "One China Policy".

These events have been increasing concern of China towards Nepal regarding security issues. There is still confusion, whether the MCC is part of Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) or not. On the other hand, the controversial letter of State Partnership Program (SPP) also disseminated in media. SPP is also one of the projects of the IPS. After controversy government of Nepal on July 21 decided to stay away from the SPP' (The Kathmandu Post, July 13, p. 2; Bhudhathoki, 2024, p. 33). The US plays a significant role in shaping the dynamics between China and Nepal, creating a triangular strategic competition. The US development initiatives such as the MCC are perceived by PRC as a counteractive measure to its influence and are viewed as part of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. This rivalry forces Nepal to navigate its relationships with both major powers, a delicate balance influenced by geopolitical issues like Tibet and economic competition for influence through development aid and infrastructure projects has been observed. The US's historical support for Tibetan issues has put it at odds with China, further complicating Nepal's position. Additionally, the US's long standing development assistance programs like USAID remain a tool for influence; though the US Trump administration has recently faced criticism and questions regarding its commitment to such aid initiatives on January 20, 2025

China perceives US initiatives, particularly the MCC, as efforts to undermine its expanding

influence in Nepal. In response, PRC actively promotes its BRI, positing it as a means to enhance infrastructure and stimulate economic growth on its own terms, directly countering US presence in Nepal. Nepal and China and Nepal signed BRI on May 12, 2017. BRI is a strategy initiated by the PRC that seeks to connect Asia with Africa and Europe via land and maritime networks to improve regional integration, increase trade and stimulate economic growth. In 2013 President Xi Jinping introduced the term, drawing from historical precedents established during the Han Dynasty, which initiated the Silk Road around 130 BC. This significant development was marked by Emperor Wu's formal opening of trade routes that linked China to the Mediterranean, a process greatly enhanced by Zhang Qian's exploratory missions to Eurasia. These efforts not only facilitated trade but also expanded Chinese influence and engagement in the region. The BRI has also been referred to in the past as "One Belt One Road" (Sangruala, 2018, p. 459-61). Furthermore, PRC has publicly denounced US actions in Nepal, labeling the MCC as a "poisoned pact" and cautioning against what it describes as "coercive diplomacy". To counterbalance US influence, PRC has broadened its engagement with Nepal, extending its focus beyond infrastructure projects to include political collaboration and foreign aid initiatives.

Nepal's delicate diplomatic balancing act has become a significant challenge as it navigates the complex geopolitical landscape between the US and PRC. The country's strategic position places it in a precarious situation, where it must carefully engage with both superpowers to protect its national interests and sovereignty. Public discourse within Nepal is often divided on issues such as MCC, with some perceiving these programs as strategic tools for the US to influence domestic politics. However, by skillfully navigating this competition, Nepal has the potential to leverage its strategic advantage and develop its own institutional capacity, ensuring it is not overly influence by either power.

Results and Discussion

Public Diplomacy in respect of Political Relations

Following the political change in 2008, Nepal transitioned into the republic State, marking a momentous shift in its governance abolishing Shah dynasty which was established four hundred sixty-seven year ago i.e. 1559 A.D. In this milieu, high-level visits have fundamental for enhancing diplomatic relations. After Rana regime, Tanka Prasad Acharya (1956) visit occurred after both the nations established diplomatic relations in 1955. During this high level visit, the first agreement on economic cooperation between the two nations was signed. B.P. Koirala visited in March 1960, resulted in the signing of the "Agreement on the Boundary Question" and raised the issue of Mount Sagarmatha and during Zhou Enlai's visit to Nepal, the two nations signed the "Treaty of Peace and Friendship". Respectively, the late King Mahendra, Birendra and the former King Gyanendra also visited PRC during their regime. Likewise, both the nations have stanch to strengthening their bilateral ties for reciprocated benefit and national interests. Thus, the two nations share an ancient tradition of regular high-level exchange, which have played a vital role in congealing their partnership. Additionally, they actively engage in bilateral, regional and multilateral forums to facilitate continuing dialogue amid State actors, ensuring consistent communication and collaboration on issues of shared concern. Thus, after 2008 till 2025 the following high level visits have been cumulated.

President Ram Baran Yadav visited China twice (Adhikari, 2016, p. 27). 'Prime Minister Oli paid a State visit to China from December 2, to December 5, 2024. During the visit, he held a meeting with Xi Jinping, President of the PRC. During these bilateral meetings extensive discussions were held on the issues of mutual interest. A total of nine documents were signed and exchanged between the two sides including the Agreement on Economic and Technical

Cooperation, Letter of Exchange on Tokha-Chhahare Tunnel, MoU on Volunteer Chinese Language Teachers, among others' (Subedi, 2019). The then Pushpa Kamal Dahal "Prachanda" paid a State visit in September, 2024. The then President Mrs. Bidya Devi Bhandari paid a State visit to China in April, 2019 and attended the second Belt and Road Forum. A total of seven bilateral agreements were signed during the visit. Earlier in March 2016, Oli, paid an official visit, both sides signed various agreements and MoUs including the Agreement on Transit Transport.

From the Chinese Side

Xi Jinping, President of the PRC paid a historic visit to Nepal in October 2019. During the visit, President Xi met with President Bhandari and held talk with Prime Minister Oli.

Economic Diplomacy and Economic Cooperation

Sino-Nepal economic cooperation dates back to the formalization of bilateral relations in 1950's. The first "Agreement between China and Nepal on Economic Aid" was signed in October 1956. From the mid 80s, the PRC Government has been pledging grant assistance to the GoN under the Economic and Technical Cooperation Program in order to implement mutually acceptable development projects.

Chinese assistance to Nepal falls into three categories: Grants (aid gratis), interest free loans and concessional loans. The Chinese financial and technical assistance to Nepal has greatly contributed to Nepal's development efforts in the areas of infrastructure building, industrialization process, human resources development, health, education, water resources, sports etc. Some of the major projects under Chinese assistance include:

Syaphrubesi-Rasuwagadhi Highway Repair and Improvement Project, Chilime-Rasuwagadhi-Kerung 220 KV transmission line Project, Sino-Nepal Cross-border Railway (Jilong-Kathmandu) Project, Kathmandu Ring Road Improvement Project (Phase II), Bir Hospital Extension Project in Duwakot, Tokha-Chhahare and Mailung-

Syabrubesi Tunnel, Xiarwa River (Hilsa Bridge), Damak Industrial Park, Narayanghat-Butwal Road Improvement Project

With the signing of the MoU on Cooperation under the BRI on May 12, 2017 in Kathmandu, and the signing of the structure for Belt and Road Cooperation on December 4, 2024 in Beijing, new avenues for bilateral cooperation in the mutually agreed areas are expected to open. After devastating earthquakes of 2015, China provided 3 billion Yuan on Nepal's reconstruction to be used in the mutually selected 25 major projects for the period of 2016-2018. The two countries signed three separate bilateral Agreements on Economic and Technical Cooperation on December 23, 2016, August 15, 2017 and June 21, 2018 (MOFA, 2025). There has been significant development in Sino-Nepal relation as China was accounted to be largest source of FDI during that period, almost two third of Nepal's total FDI used to come from China (Zhangrui, 2017).

There were various sector co-operations between the two nations. Some of the major projects built under Chinese assistance are: Arniko Highway (115 km) from Kodari to Kathmandu, it is northeast of Kathmandu Valley, on the Sino-Nepal border. At the Sino- Nepal Friendship Bridge it connects China National Highway 318 (G318) to Lhasa, and finally to Shanghai. It was made in 1960. Similarly, China has built Prithvi Highway (174KM) from Naubise to Pokhara. This highway establishes a connection between Kathmandu and western Nepal. It was constructed in 1967, Kathmandu Ring Road (27 KM) and extends to 8 lanes recently. Pokhara-Baglung highway connects Kaski, Parbat and Baglung districts. Syaphrubesi Rasuwagadhi Road Project, thus highway and road transportation project support by China. Bansbari Leather and Shoes Factory, Hetauda Cotton Textile Mills, Harisidhi Brick Factory, Bhrikuti Paper Mills, Lumbini Sugar Mills, Sunkoshi Hydroelectricity Plant, Pokhara Water Conservancy and Irrigation Project (Multipurpose), B.P. Koirala Memorial Cancer Hospital, Civil Service Hospital, National Ayurveda Research Centre, Satdobato Sports Complex, City Hall in Kathmandu and Birendra

International Convention, Pokhara and Lumbini International Regional Airport (MOF, 2014). Ongoing projects under Chinese assistance include Upper Trishuli Hydropower Project, Kathmandu Ring Road Improvement Project, and National Armed Police Force Academy Project (MOF, 2014).

Military and Exchange of Power

China- Nepal relations in the military and power exchange domains are characterized by an increase in military collaboration with China actively seeking to assert its influence amid Nepal's internal political challenges. The partnership aims to counterbalance India's longstanding dominance while ensuring stability along their shared border, particularly concerning Tibet. Military cooperation has broadened to encompass training, equipment provision and joint exercises with a focus on enhancing capabilities in counter terrorism, disaster response, high altitude operations and UN peacekeeping efforts. Notably, the "Sagarmatha Friendship" joint military drill initiated in 2017 and set to resume in 2024 and 2025, exemplify this growing collaboration.

Additionally, China provides opportunities for Nepal Army officers at its military academies, such as the National Defense University, fostering long term military ties and nurturing relationships with future Nepali Military officers. In this strategic context, China perceives strengthened military relations as a means to bolster border security, mitigate cross border activities, particularly related to Tibet and diminish Nepal's historical dependence on India in defense matters.

In response, Nepal adopts a "hedging" foreign policy, balancing its economic ties with India while leveraging its relationship with China to maintain autonomy and prevent over reliance on its southern bloc. Central to this political dynamic Nepal's adherence to the "One China Policy" ensuring its territory is not used for anti China activities, while China reciprocates by supporting Nepal's sovereignty. Ultimately, China's engagement in Nepal's military and political arenas reflects a strategic effort to bolster its regional presence,

safeguard its border interests and counter India's influence, all while navigating the complexities of Nepal's domestic politics and its quest for strategic independence.

Tourism, Trade and Religious

China is the second largest trading partner of Nepal. In 2022/23, total exports to China approximately \$17.5 million USD and 2024/2025 approximately \$12.33 million USD. The data covers the period from mid-July 2024 to mid-March 2025 (eight months into the fiscal year), with more recent monthly data available. During the same period the import from China was approximately US\$2.16 billion and approximately \$2.5 billion USD respectively. Trade deficit of Nepal with China has been in an increasing trend. China has given zero tariff entry facility to over 8,000 Nepali products since 2009. Nepal regularly participates in various trade fairs and exhibitions organized in China. Nepal-China's Tibet Economic and Trade Fair is the regular biannual event hosted by either side alternatively to enhance business interaction and promote economic cooperation between China and Nepal (MoF, 2025)

Ghoble (1986) 'examines Sino-Nepal trade and economic relations, which are relevant to our society. He claims that Sino-Nepal commerce is typical of an industrialized nation and an agricultural and handicraft-based nation'. 'China buys 85% raw materials from Nepal and exports 75% produced goods and machinery' (Gautam, 2023, p. 70). Nepal-China Non-Governmental Cooperation Forum was established in 1996, which is led by the President of the Federation of Nepali Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FNCCI) from the Nepali side and the Vice Head of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) from the Chinese side. It is an initiative to mobilize the apex business organizations of both sides to enhance cooperation between the private sectors of two sides. China is the largest sources of FDI in Nepal. Total FDI received from China in FY 2023/24 was approximately \$ 35.5 billion USD and Nepal's Department of Industry reported that committed FDI for the FY 2024/25 (ending

July 15, 2025) totaled \$472.85 million USD (NRB, 2025).

The Chinese Government has announced the year 2025 as Nepal Visit Year in China. Nepal has road connectivity with China via Rasuwagadhi and Tatopani border points for trade and international travelers. There are four other border points designated for bilateral trade. Nepal has direct air link with Lhasa, Chengdu, Kunming, Guangzhou and Hong Kong SAR of China (MoFA, 2025).

Balance of Power

Over these days both the nations has maintained good relation but some geopolitical realities still put Nepal more closely to India which disturbs this Equi-distance balance (Poudyal, 2022). The Power dynamics between PRC and Nepal are heavily influenced by China's substantial economic and strategic presence stemming from its position as Nepal's prominent northern neighbor. In response, Nepal adopts a foreign policy aimed at balancing its relationships with both the immediate neighbors, striving to safeguard its sovereignty while reaping economic advantages. PRC's involvement in Nepal is evident through its investments in infrastructure, trade and development assistance, particularly under initiatives like the BRI, which have gradually shifted the regional influence away from India. Nepal's strategic location between these two neighbors enhances its geopolitical significance, promoting PRC to penetrate its engagement to secure its interest and promote regional stability. Additionally, PRC employs soft power tactics, investing in sectors such as health, education and tourism to foster goodwill and strengthen its foothold in Nepal. To navigate this complex landscape, Nepal pursues a non aligned foreign policy, engaging with both powers to maintain autonomy and avoid becoming a pawn in their rivalry. By diversifying its economy and seeking foreign investments, Nepal aims to enhance its role as a transit hub, particularly by improving access to Chinese ports. This evolving relationship is further complicated by Nepal's vast hydropower potential, which positions its water resources as a

strategic asset, amplifying the geopolitical stakes in its interactions with both the neighboring States. Nepal faces the dual challenge of attracting essential investment for its development while safeguarding its sovereignty. This task is further complicated by the fierce competition among major global powers varying for influence in the region.

Conflict Relationship between China and Nepal

Reports emerged in September 2020; 'China has constructed nine building on the Nepali side, encroaching on Nepali land in Limi of Humla. There were widespread anti-China protests outside the Chinese embassy in Kathmandu. Media reports also cited a recent survey conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture, Nepal has claimed that there have been illegal Chinese encroachments in bordering districts including Dolakha, Gorkha, Darchula, Humla, Sindhupalchowk, Sankhuwasabha and Rasuwa districts' (ANI.World News, 2021). To understand the nature of the present border disputes, it is important to look at the historical context and how the Sino-Nepal border agreement was drafted.

Nepal and Tibet signed a trade agreement to strengthen border relations at Khasa on September 5, 1775. The agreement also mentioned that the border will remain unchanged. During the reign of Bahadur Shah, he sent a strong message expressing dissatisfaction with the trade agreement and in the summer of 1778, Nepal sent troops to attack Tibet. With this attack, the congenial relationship between the two neighbors deteriorated. Tibet often used China's military help to push Nepal back but, finally, when Tibet realized that Nepal had achieved success in most sectors (like Khasa and Kuti), it pushed for border talks. Hence, the Treaty of Thapathali or the Nepal-Tibet Peace Treaty was signed on March 24, 1856 through which the final settlement of Nepal's northern border with Tibet was reached.

Relations between China and Nepal in the last few decades have been an example of friendship and mutual understanding. The relationship between the two countries flourished after Tibet became a part of China, for the first time, the two

neighbors shared a boundary of 1,439 kilometers. Nepal and China decided to delineate and demarcate the boundary line through the China-Nepal Boundary Agreement on March 21, 1960. This boundary agreement replaced the Treaty of Thapathali and recognized China's sovereignty over Tibet and agreed to surrender all privileges and rights granted by the old treaty.

After a detailed survey and mapping on both sides, a formal settlement of the Boundary treaty was finalized on October 5, 1961. The boundary line was demarcated on the basis of traditional use by the country, possessions and convenience. There were conflict areas where the policy of 'give and take' was used. Nepal had given about 1,836 square kilometers of land to China, while China had given Nepal 2,139 square kilometers of land. Furthermore, the watershed principle of the Himalayan range was used to demarcate the boundary on the Northern side (Article I). The area encompasses various passes, mountain peaks and pastures lands. The cases in which the pasture lands of a citizen of one country falls on the other side of the border, the choice of citizenship was given to the landowner (1960 Boundary Agreement)

The boundary line was jointly demarcated physically and there were conflicts, debates, claims and counterclaims in thirty-two areas. The disputes that emerged during the joint demarcation were settled with the five principles of peaceful co-existence and respecting the status of each other in the international arena. After the border survey and demarcation of territory according to the delimitation of the treaty, the joint survey team started erecting permanent pillars and markers, specified from serial number one to seventy-nine from west to east from June 21, 1962, at various points on the border line. There were forty-eight larger and thirty-one small size pillars and markers. Apart from this, there were twenty offset pillars constructed where there was a possibility of disappearance of the main pillars due to natural calamities. The total demarcated boundary between the two countries was 1439.18 kilometers.

The Nepal-China boundary protocol was signed on January 20, 1963, which laid out a basic rule for an inspection, every five years, of the whole demarcated boundary by teams from both countries. The protocol was renewed three times and the damaged pillars were repaired.

However, there were some minor conflicts that emerged over the boundary over the last few decades. For instance, in the north of Lapchigaun in Lamabagar area of Dolakha district, the pillar marked fifty-seven has been claimed to be placed inside Nepal instead of what was initially assumed. The dispute concerns six hectares of land and because of this dispute; the fourth protocol is still on hold. Currently, the dispute is regarding the height of Mount Everest. China claims it to be 8844.43 meters while Nepal claims it as 8848 meters. The boundary markers were repaired and installed after inspection in 2005 to formulate the fourth protocol, but with the dispute that emerged over the pillar marked fifty-seven the fourth protocol never happened. The boundary talks between the two nations have also been at a halt since then.

Diaspora and Nepal China Diplomatic Relations

China offers hundred scholarships annually to Nepalese students pursuing their studies in various universities of China. In accordance with the MoU on Cultural Cooperation established in 1999 and the MoU on Youth Exchange from 2009, both nations have actively engaged in cultural and youth initiatives. These efforts include organizing cultural festivals, facilitating friendly visits among diverse groups, and hosting exhibitions, film screenings and food festivals, all aimed at enhancing people to people connections.

Collaboration between Nepal and China Regional and International Relations

China wishes to take its relations at a 'strategic level' with Nepal (Giri, 2019; [Bhatta, 2024, p. 92](#)). Nepal is the founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and holds the status of a Dialogue Partner in the SCO. Both countries are also the members of the

Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD). China is the observer of the SAARC. Both countries have been cooperating with each other in various UN forums on matters of common interests. Nepal has joined the Group of Friends of Global Development Initiative (GDI). China treats Nepal as its closest neighbor and as one of the best friends. In a report by the Chinese Embassy, it has stated that 'We highly appreciate the strong support Nepal has given to us over the years on the questions of Taiwan and Tibet and other major issues related to China's sovereign rights and interests' (Chinese Embassy to Nepal, 2015, [Dahal, 1019, p.86](#)).

Bilateral Relations

There are a number of bilateral mechanisms between Nepal and China. Other bilateral mechanisms include Nepal-China Inter-Governmental Economic and Trade Committee, Nepal-China Joint Committee on Agriculture Cooperation, Border Law Enforcement Cooperation, Border Customs Meeting, Joint Tourism Co-ordination Committee, Nepal-China's Tibet Trade Facilitation Committee (NTTFC), Energy Cooperation Mechanism, Mechanism for Facilitation on the Implementation of China-Nepal Cooperation Programs and Projects in Nepal, among others. The twelfth meeting of NTTFC was held on April 29 to May 3, 2024 in Kathmandu. The first Energy Cooperation Mechanism Meeting was held in Kathmandu on September 28, 2018. The First meeting of the Mechanism for Facilitation on the Implementation of China-Nepal Cooperation Programs and Projects in Nepal was held in Kathmandu on December 3, 2018. Besides these, there are Nepal-Tibet Joint Tourism Coordination Committee, Annual Border Customs Meeting, Nepal China Coordination Mechanism on Border Trade and Cooperation, Nepal China's Tibet Economic and Trade Fair, Nepal Aid Project etc.

Conclusion

Deteriorating State of affairs of the last Qing Dynasty since the end of nineteenth century had given space for external interferences. China faced deep political instability since the end of

Qing dynasty to the 1949. Communist revolution in China succeeded in with under the leadership of Mao Zedong. At the almost same time in Nepal, Rana regime was collapse. Monarchy and democratic political party succeeded to establish democratic regime in 1951. With new regime came in Nepal and China, the two countries established formal diplomatic relations in 1955. Both countries agreed to augment bilateral relationship based on "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence", also known as Panchsheel. Developing world due to their own structural problem and bad governance practices sometime lost capacities to maintain relations with major powers and get the benefits.

The primary aim of contemporary foreign policy of Nepal is to uphold the nation's dignity by protecting its sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence while also rapidly growing economic prosperity and wellbeing. Additionally, it seeks to contribute to global peace, harmony and security. The guiding principles of this policy include mutual respect for territorial integrity, non-interference in domestic affairs, equality among nations, peaceful dispute resolution and cooperation for mutual benefit, all grounded in a commitment to the UN Charter and the value of world peace. According to the constitution of Nepal 2015, the national interest encompasses the protection of freedom, sovereignty and dignity, alongside ensuring border security and economic welfare. The state is directed to maintain IR that reflect sovereign equality and to pursue an independent foreign policy rooted in non alignment and international law, while actively safeguarding national interests and reviewing past treaties to ensure they align with mutual interests.

In the years after the rise of Jung Bahadur Rana, Anglo-Nepal relations strengthened while Sino-Nepal relations weakened as the former was caught up in the Taiping Rebellion. China even lost its status to notice much of Nepal and on the other hand, Nepal took the least notice of China while still the Betrawati was in place and was never canceled. Thereafter on April 28, 1960, Nepal and China signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship,

and 246 years after the Betrawati Treaty, the two countries returned to cordial diplomatic relations. For about 1238 years from 618 till March 24, 1856 (the year of the Thapathali Treaty) Nepal and China under the Silk Road Trade Policy enjoyed smooth trade and transaction. After 161 years since 1856, on May 12, 2017, the two countries renewed the Silk Road Concept into BRI.

The Sino-Nepal relationship begins in the ancient period. The pilgrim trips and diplomatic visits have existed since many hundred years ago, which is from the Silk Road era to the contemporary BRI. It is also interesting to note that Nepal-China relationship is the oldest in the diplomatic history of Nepal. In the bilateral Sino-Nepal Military history and for the first time, a ten day-long joint military exercise “Sagarmatha Friendship 2017” took place on a small scale and is a good start to that front. In the end, Nepal-China relations should be enhanced in a constructive form without hindering National integrity.

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Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

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