Transitional Justice and the Epistemological Limits of GNR in Nepal’s Constitutional Settlement

Abstract

Guarantees of Non-Repetition (GNR) constitute the most structurally ambitious dimension of transitional justice, demanding not only accountability for past violations but the reconstruction of state institutions to prevent future conflict. Accommodative constitutional design, in which former rebels participate in constitution-making through elected assemblies, negotiated reforms, and power-sharing arrangements, has been idealized as the dominant mechanism for crafting political settlements and securing non-repetition in post conflict societies. Nepal’s transition following the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement exemplifies one of the most faithful applications of this model. Through the establishment of an inclusive, secular, and federal republic, the constitutional process sought to address historical patterns of exclusion while integrating former Maoist insurgents into competitive democratic politics. That model now faces an essential reassessment following the return of coordinated, urban political violence in September 2025. This article argues that Nepal’s experience exposes the institutional limitations of accommodative constitutional design as a self-sufficient GNR mechanism. Delayed transitional justice processes, the systematic subversion of institutions of accountability, and entrenched economic underdevelopment have collectively undermined the constitutional architecture. Drawing on comparative evidence from South Africa and Colombia, the article pushes the boundaries of standard institutional critique and prompts a deeper philosophical re-engagement with GNR. It demonstrates that inclusive constitution-making tends to reconfigure elite power rather than dismantle the structural conditions enabling conflict. This contextuality is underlined by an epistemological limitation at the heart of GNR as a normative assumption: constitutional settlements can address only the grievances identified at a particular historical moment; political preferences and frustrations of future generations remain beyond the promise any “presentist” constitutional text can deliver.