

Doi: <https://doi.org/10.3126/ncwaj.v57i1.93633>

# Rhizomatic Protest and Its Impact in Nepal from the Perspective of Gen Z Movement

Dipendra Adhikari\*

Kushal Gaire\*\*

## Abstract

The 2025 Gen Z movement in Nepal cannot be termed as a simplistic youth-driven protest, but it was a structural contest between digitally networked non-state forces and a traditional constitutional state attempting to maintain institutional wholeness. This paper asserts that the separation of powers, legitimization of parties, and small-state digital sovereignty limits were all challenged by rhizomatic, digitally mediated mobilization, which undermined the boundaries of Nepal. This crisis, which saw a former Chief Justice appointed as an interim Prime Minister, sheds some light on the world of how the protests of the digital age can blur constitutional boundaries. In this regard, the Nepali case indicates that youth activism in the platform age is constitutional, political, and geopolitical. The long-held argument is that youth are the most critical actors in social and political change. Nevertheless, the age-based parameters used by international and other regional institutions to define youth are often characterized by the disregard of social, cultural, and political milieus that shape youth agency. Therefore, this article stresses that a contextualized understanding of youth is essential to the critical assessment of the modern protest movements (Pickard, 2020). Since generational mobilization is not only the way to describe the lack of democracies in the country, but also the forces of the large-scale structural transformations in the international order.

*Keywords:* Gen Z, rhizomatic protest, non-state actor, geopolitics, transnational, digital activism, non-violent protest

## Introduction

The 2025 Gen Z protests in Nepal were first instigated by the government trying to impose local registration and supervision of 26 large social media platforms, which were seen by the youth activists as censoring the internet (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2025). The movement soon spread out to take care of the bigger grievances, such as corruption, inefficiencies in the government, absence of transparency, and poor youth involvement in the decision-making process. The movement rapidly spread to deal with

---

\* Mr. Adhikari holds M.Phil. in International Relations and Diplomacy & LLM in International Law and Constitutional Law.

\*\* Mr. Gaire is a Legal Researcher.

more extensive demands, such as corruption and absence of transparency, stagnation of the economy, and poor involvement of the youth in decision-making, which led to the extreme loss of lives in the clash between the protesters and the security forces and ensuing vandalism. In the wake of such events, Nepal was taken to a sudden political crisis, leading to the resignation of Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli with an interim government under the leadership of former Chief Justice Sushila Karki (Times of India, 2025). Although these processes are indicative of internal democratic inefficiencies and institutional fragilities as direct factors in the turbulence, the demonstrations also reveal the impact of the international and transnational digital networks, which increase the mobilization of youth across national boundaries.

In academic discussions, recent society is often segmented into discrete generations: Traditionalists, Baby Boomers, Generation X, Generation Y (Millennial), and Generation Z, with each group demarcated by particular socio-historical circumstances (Kowske et al., 2010). In this typology, Generation Z is taking a special, relevant stand among the generation of young people. Those who were born around the middle of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2010s are entering the phase of maturity in an environment that is marked by digital connectivity, increased globalization, the escalation of the climate crisis, and the changing geopolitical orientations. Unlike previous generations that were rather shaped by phenomena of territorial scale like the Cold War, the experiences of Generation Z are mediated by transnational digital networks. Being digital natives, these people use political information, mobilization, and activism in ways that cut across national boundaries, which connect in new ways of civic organization and transnational solidarity (Thapa, 2026). Such a significant restructuring of the modes of participation places Generation Z on the front line of modern struggles that involve human rights, environmental justice, and the quest to gain democratic responsibility (Alam, 2025).

One of the most conspicuous effects of Generation Z on politics in the world is the introduction of transcontinental protest movements. These protests often go by the term Gen Z protest and have been emanating throughout South Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the 2020s, organized largely via the use of short-form video apps like TikTok, Instagram, and encrypted messaging services instead of formal political parties. The global spread of these protests also defines how digital connectivity allows Gen Z to take on established political elites and hold them responsible in ways often unreachable to earlier generations. As an example, the presence of grassroots activism has led to major political upheavals in various situations, such as in Bangladesh, Kenya, and Nepal- incidents that portend a shift in the power balance between the youthful groups and the state machineries. However, it would be too much to consider this transformation as the lasting one; Gen Z activism is praised as the one promoting democratic engagement, and it is also criticized as the one that does not have a balanced and even effect. In environments, scholars note that, where coordination or capacity is not encouraged or possible in state institutions, youth movements can find it difficult to

have sustained effects and can instead be absorbed by the dominant power structures. Nevertheless, the ability of these movements to quickly gain international attention highlights the fact that there is a radical shift in the dynamics of the international relations system, one whereby power is becoming contested outside of the limits of conventional diplomatic efforts (Weber, 2021).

### **Theoretical Framework**

In a state-centered view, Jeff Goodwin observes that collective mobilization is usually a reaction to state action as opposed to a move to take over the power of the state by non-state actors. Mobilization, according to Goodwin, is an act of desperation on the part of individuals and groups who think that there is no alternative to the situation pushed by the non-state actors (Goodwin, 2001). This logic is evident in the protest movements of Gen Z in the modern world.

In addition to this state-focused perspective, the theory of power and counter-power offered by Manuel Castells focuses on the interactive and symbolic aspects of power. According to Castells, power is not obtained by using coercion, and it is better maintained by creating meanings within the minds of people (Castells, 2012). Here, the communication technologies, inclusive of social media platforms, messaging applications, and digital networks, are of paramount importance in facilitating empowerment and mobilization as a unit. In the case of Gen Z, social networks like TikTok, Instagram, and Twitter make it easier to arrange the movement of activism, share stories, and build symbolic power to amplify dissent.

Besides the state-centered and communication approaches, the Resource Mobilization Theory provides a theoretical base for how social movements form and support momentum. According to this theory, an achievement of movement hinges on the tactical acquisition and utilization of both material and non-material resources, such as expertise, networks, organizational structure, access to the media, as well as symbolic legitimacy, and not on grievances or shared dissatisfaction alone (Jenkins, 1983). Lastly, the Framing Theory explains how movements create and transmit meaning to win followers and specify their objectives. Framing processes in modern-day digital activism take place by use of symbolic narratives, hashtags, and visual materials that satisfy various audiences, and thus influence the local and international understanding of protests.

The roots of the new life are sprouting everywhere, so there is no center plan, but a fluid movement and networking to maintain the energy flowing, awaiting a spring. Since these nodes are always linked either to internet networks or local grids or personal networks, it is these nodes that are trembling with the beat of a new form of revolution, and its ultimate act is that of self-invention (Castells, 2012). It is a modern change, which is referred to as rhizomatic protest, and where youth movements are decentralized, leaderless, and supported by digital networks and various cultural

expressions like memes and satire (Sastramidjaja, 2024). The peculiarity of the present generation is not only in their protest but in the way they do it, spreading common signs and tactics between the national borders and making their voices heard in the dialogue of state activity and global government. In the sections below, these global practices are discussed in the context of Gen Z activism as a field of international relations.

### **Transnational Contagion of Protests**

The fact that the internationalization of activism formats of the modern Gen Z is a characteristic feature of the current youth movements is obvious. The so-called Asian spring summarizes a series of youth-led protests that started in Sri Lanka (2022) and then spread to Bangladesh (2024), followed by Nepal, Indonesia, and the Philippines by 2025 (Thapa, 2026). The major trigger in all these theatres has been local dissatisfaction based on economic mismanagement, corruption, censorship, and exclusionary political habits, but they were all interconnected via the similar means of digital organization and coordination (Dieterich et al., 2025). This interdependence is a kind of digital cosmopolitanism, whereby information and tactical blueprints are relayed across national borders in real time (Sastramidjaja, 2024), thus enabling the youth groups to appropriate and adjust strategies of one cultural setting to others. Social media systems like TikTok, Instagram, Discord, and Telegram have served as instruments of mobilization, allowing activists to spread protest strategies, iconography, and narratives to audiences that are geographically and culturally dispersed in multiple ways on a global scale (KC, 2025).

In Nepal, the transnational effect occurred in real life, with Gen Z demonstrators using methods of decentralized, digital-first organization that had been witnessed in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. These were the use of viral hashtags, short-form videos, and symbolic images. An excellent example of common symbolic repertoire is a pirate flag, shown in the animated series *One Piece*, that was used during protests in Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, and even Morocco as a symbol of opposition and unity (Ratcliffe, 2025). Culturally specific, however, those symbols also gain an international presence via the viral dissemination, thus demonstrating that Nepali youth movements are not solitary but are instead incorporated into the network of the world. This transnational spread helped in uniting nationwide demonstrations in Nepal against social media ban, government ineffectiveness, and corruption, and thus showed how localized dissatisfactions are enhanced and validated by observing and imitating the actions of regional movements.

### **Local Complaints and Global Discourses**

The transnational Gen Z movements have their local grievances and also have transnational aspects, at the same time reflecting structural concerns on the state level. The anti-censorship student movements in Bangladesh (2024) resulted in a national movement that removed old systems of political leadership. On the same note, youth protests in Africa and Latin America are an example of counter-responses to

disenfranchisement and political injustice in the economy. The long-term mobilization and the protest movement in Kenya, in particular, questioned the taxation, political violence, and governmental indifference, creating systemic injustices and causing the outcry and demands to resign (Ombuor, 2025). In Madagascar, due to the large number of power outages and scarcity of water, which are among the fundamental needs, citizen activism resulted in violent demonstrations and calls for the resignation of the government (Associated Press, 2025). The unifying element of these movements is not a collective agenda and purpose but more a collective feeling of generational disenfranchisement, and that the political institutions are unresponsive, corrupt, and uninterested in bringing about any substantive changes.

The identity behind these movements is not a policy-driven agenda or a common purpose, but a sense of disenfranchisement that transcends generations and is based on the feeling that political institutions are oblivious, corrupt, and uninterested in real structural change to the point of real reform. This exclusion was evident in Nepal in the 2025 Gen Z protests, which first appeared in response to attempts by the government to censor social media but quickly grew into a wider group of complaints, such as corruption, ineffective administration, and the desperate need for youth involvement in decision-making processes. The Nepali activist models, which include decoupled, rhizomatic, and digitally coordinated, manifest the impact of the transnational protest repertoires and show how world strategies and symbols can be localized. The Nepali example highlights a two-fold dynamic: the institutional weaknesses within the nation present an ideal environment in which mobilization can take place, and the transnational and digital aspects of the process increase the movement, thus gaining both domestic and international coverage. It is through this interaction that a question of what has been dubbed platform imperialism emerges, in which the international digital systems, most of them controlled by companies that cannot be regulated by the laws of the state, determine the expression, scale, and influence of youth-led activism, thus creating a direct connection between global networks and local politics (Gillespie, 2018).

### **Methods of Activism**

**Digital Activism:** In many nations, the population perceives social networks and the internet as very powerful tools to affect the political processes (Wike, 2022). Hashtags turn personal messages into shared action, thus enabling the participants to take up new spaces of the public (Tisdall & Cuevas-Parra, 2022). This technology also saves on expenses in the organization of events, as well as the dissemination of information, helping to promote wider support. The digital action of protesting is becoming a common trend, as demonstrators use the new tools of communication to achieve their goals within a short period of time, sharing information and resisting oppression (Sloam, 2014). Creativity and innovation turn out to be crucial resources of effective activism, and youth have helped to make civic action more mobile and nimbler, often making it more inclusive in both participation and decision-making (Duncombe & Harrebye, 2022).

**Non-Violent Protests:** The general trend of protests and mass mobilizations is that it has become less violent over the years. One of the most famous platforms that observes political violence, ACLED, reports that there is a high disparity between the increasing number of peaceful protests and a comparatively constant number of riots. Despite the increase in violent flanks in non-violent mass protests calling for regime change since the 2000s, data on these campaigns also show a much larger number of actions that are overall non-violent than those that are violent (Chenoweth & Shay, 2022). Although there had been increased cases of violence in non-violent mass movements that demand regime change since the 2000s, records show that the number of non-violent actions is many times more than the violent ones. This is an important point of observation since the non-violent campaigns have greater chances of success and may lead to greater democratization and stability in the long-term.

### **Gen Z and Social Media/Internet**

Over the past twenty years, social media has been introduced and transformed into a digital platform that has revolutionized the digital world. Since the early days of the early networks, social media has evolved into not just the way people communicate and interact but also how people perceive and interact with the world around them (Dijck, 2013). The key to this revolution has been the development of Generation Z, a generational cohort that has been raised in a digital-first world. The use of social media by Gen Z is not only characterized by its frequency and time but also by a special flexibility to constant innovations in social media (Sharma, Kaushal, & Joshi, 2023). It has resulted in a drastic rise in the number of users, particularly those in the young age groups, who browse through these platforms with an unmatched degree of sophistication and instinctiveness (Twenge & Martin, 2020).

The relationship between Gen Z and social media is multifaceted, encompassing aspects of communication, entertainment, information dissemination, and social interaction. Notably, this cohort's interaction with social media has raised questions about its impacts, both positive and negative. While some studies highlight the benefits of social media in fostering connectivity and creativity, Gen Z and social media are in a complex relationship that includes elements of communication, entertainment, dissemination of information, and social interaction. Interestingly, the use of social media among this group has put in doubt the effects, both positive and negative. Although there are studies that show the positive effects of social media on building connectivity and creativity (Pichler et al., 2021). Gen Z has been brought up in a world of social media, AI, and uninterrupted internet connectivity. They are demanding fluidity, speed, and interactive content (McKinsey & Company, 2025). The values of authenticity, inclusiveness, and purpose are reinventing this generation and transforming its consumption, politics, spirituality, and social norms (McKinsey & Company, 2018). In the case of online platforms, the construction of identities is possible due to the interaction and performance carried out by users during continuous interaction. In the case of Gen Z,

it becomes possible to mediate identity by using Instagram aesthetics, TikTok trends, and YouTube stories. Such practices produce hybrid practices of global-local cultures (Pichler et al., 2021).

During the year, 81 new restrictions were put on board in 21 countries. As in 2024, Asia was again the top (Surfshark, 2025). The governments of ten Asian countries imposed 56 new restrictions. These limitations apply to approximately 2.2 billion individuals or about 27 percent of the global population. Africa came in second with 20 new cases, as brought up by eight countries that all affected a total of 344 million people. Once again, India took the leading position in the list of most internet-restricted countries in the Asian region. In 2025, it carried 24 new restrictions, which is slightly higher than the 23 imposed in 2024. In Jammu and Kashmir, after the repeal of Article 370 in August 2019, the government targeted 213 days of internet disconnect; the longest internet blockage in recorded history in a free society. This impacted negatively on journalism, business, education, and even healthcare (Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, 2020). Other Asian countries and territories that had had to deal with internet restrictions were Iraq (9 cases), Afghanistan (7 cases), Jammu and Kashmir (5 cases), Iran (4 cases), Turkey and Nepal (2 cases each), Pakistan, Vietnam, and Yemen (1 case each).

Such blackouts are often given an excuse of riot control, misinformation control, or countering terrorism. Social media and internet prohibitions are not always effective in suppressing discontent; in fact, they may lead to youth mobilization by making it seem as an extension of civic rights and democracy to include digital ban. Blocking of the internet and large platforms is damaging to freedom of expression and access to information, which is a vital part of digitally native generations' communication, organization, and dissemination of political complaints (Tufekci, 2015). Rather than leading to demobilization, these bans often lead youth activists to take recourse to recourse technologies such as virtual private networks (VPNs), encrypted messaging, and alternative platforms to keep communications and coordination alive (Coward & Pomerantz, 2022). Digital activism studies reveal that movements that are censored tend to build decentralized and strong networks that continue with the momentum of protests even in limited conditions (Jackson, Bailey, & Welles, 2016). As such, limitations on the internet and social media backfire to become the drivers of more wide-scale political participation and new types of youth activism instead of restrictions on mobilization (Freelon et al., 2017).

### **Nepal and Platform Imperialism**

Platform imperialism is the control of digital platforms of the world that are usually owned and controlled by corporations in the Global North over local communication infrastructures, politics, and flows of knowledge in the Global South (Robinson, 2000). This tension is frequently brought into the limelight in the case of social media bans or restrictions by states: the governments are trying to manage the political mobilization, but the underlying digital infrastructure is mostly external and controlled

by the corporations, and the relationship between the sovereign and the corporation is also complicated (Couldry & Mejias, 2019). To the activists of Gen Z, this dynamic implies their tactics have to traverse both the censorship of the state and the policies and algorithms of the multinational media that determine the visibility, amplification, and reach of the political message (Zuboff, 2019). The fact that the state cannot entirely control such sites highlights some kind of digital addiction whereby the validity and success of the local political mobilization process is mediated by foreign-owned technology. As a result, the youth-led politics in Nepal and other nations are in a twofold predicament: they must fight against the repression on a national scale and participate in the globalized digital domain, which affects the local level of activism and its international presence (Howard & Hussain, 2020).

The concept of platform imperialism as applied to the Nepali case does not just involve international corporations dominating digital space, but also the way in which a small state with weak regulatory power tries to deal with the multinational platforms and tries to exert its sovereign power on the communication infrastructures. The legislative and regulatory practices in Nepal have long been behind the explosive development of digital media, leaving loopholes that enable as well as restrict the action of the state in cyberspace (Bhattarai, 2025). The 2025 Gen Z-style protests put it into a nice light: when the government has tried to block usage of 26 large platforms, forcing them to be locally registered and locally supervised, the institutional constraints of a small state trying to regulate the actions of actors the rules of which are framed by the principles of corporate rather than popular legislation were brought into the limelight (Gautam et al., 2025). Ironically, this claim to control was heavily viewed as digital repression within the country, which drove harder mobilization among youths and strengthened criticism all over the world against the diminishing digital freedoms (Digital Rights Nepal, 2025).

The fact that Nepal interacted with the 26 big social media companies describes the tensions of platform imperialism on a small state. As the government tried to introduce local control, such as the mandate of content control, access to user information, and platform registration to operate in the country (Gautam et al., 2025), these corporations mostly opposed, referring to the international corporate practices and global privacy regulations (Gillespie, 2018). The asymmetry in structure in this negotiation was between a small state trying to demand sovereign control and multinational corporations whose governance systems are found in the global markets and the parent-state laws (Couldry & Mejias, 2019).

### **Digital Sovereignty and Small-State Diplomacy**

In the case of Nepal and its attempt to attain digital sovereignty, the interconnectivity between the authority of the state within its borders and international relations can be challenging to resolve as a small state maneuvers the global digital landscape. Although the government has tried to control the foreign social media outlets and exert content control over them, these measures reveal the systemic constraints of the

small-state position of Nepal because the multinational corporations and transnational digital regulations tend to prevail over the local requirements (Couldry & Mejias, 2019). The 2025 restrictions on the internet and social media, following protests by the youth, brought out the tension between supporting national security and democratic participation: any efforts to curb the flow of information were faced not only with national backlash by Gen Z activists but with international criticism by human rights organizations and international observers (Gautam et al., 2025). According to scholars, states such as Nepal also tend to be asymmetric in regulation, such that while they need to negotiate their conformity to international platforms, they also need to defend national sovereignty, and that is what determines foreign policy and diplomatic engagement (Gillespie, 2018).

In this respect, Gen Z activism emerges as a transnational actor, since the online networks publicize local complaints to the international community, which indirectly affects the diplomatic reputation of Nepal and shapes its participation in the regional discussions on internet regulation in such forums as SAARC, BIMSTEC, and UN meetings (Howard & Hussain, 2020). Finally, the case of Nepal shows that digital sovereignty among small states is not only a domestic matter: it is related to a combination of international relations, platform management, and approaches of digitally empowered youth movements (Bhattarai, 2025).

### **Aftermath of Gen Z Protest: Law and Politics**

The 2025 Gen Z protests in Nepal demonstrated a well-rooted constitutional and jurisprudential framing of the implementation of the separation of powers as per the Constitution of Nepal. After a series of mass mobilizations against political corruption, economic stagnation, and any limitations on digital freedoms, President Ramchandra Paudel dissolved Parliament and appointed former Chief Justice Sushila Karki as the interim prime minister, a move subject to an instant legal turmoil (Timalsina & Shrestha, 2025). Article 132 (2) of the Constitution sets a prohibition on former judges in office that could threaten the independence of the judiciary. Legal academics claimed that since Karki was no longer a chief justice, but the head of government, it compromised the constitutional principle of institutional neutrality. Others had justified the appointment as the ‘doctrine of necessity’, claiming that extraordinary political circumstances were such that it was necessary to give eligibility norms a flexible interpretation to maintain continuity in governance (Dahal, 2026). Jurisprudential internal debate focuses on whether such exceptions undermine safeguards established to prevent concentration of power and safeguard institutional integrity, or if they are necessary adaptations in the face of crises of the digital era whose processes traditional constitutional safeguards were not structured to handle.

Transitional moves within Nepal were also marked with concerns on human rights, constitutionalism, and democratic accountability as the country moved through its transition. Amnesty International and human rights watchdogs issued joint declarations

compelling the interim government to follow the basic freedoms of expression and assembly, saying that even during the instability, states must ensure that they follow the constitutional rights as well as the international rights of protecting civil liberties (Amnesty International; Human Rights Watch, 2025). The dissolution of Parliament and an interim leadership were also legally and rhetorically mobilized against by major political parties of Nepal as constitutionally dubious and as potentially leading to extra-institutional responses to pressure to protest. Gen Z-motivated mobilization greatly disturbed the traditional parties' legitimacy by compelling long-standing players to reconsider strategies amid trying to assimilate decentralized civic mobilization into official policymaking structures. Populist rhetoric has overtaken the post-movement political arena; some of its manifestations include the use of youth demands to support a reform cause by some leaders, but the same appeal to the people without pushing to constitutional and institutional processes can only fuel polarization and trigger a new crisis of governance.

## Conclusion

Generation Z has emerged as a digitally enabled, transnationally aware generation, the activist praxis of which is re-configuring domestic politics and international relations. The protests by Gen Z in Nepal in 2025 exemplify a rhizomatic type of dissent, which is decentralized, leaderless, and networked, as well, challenging the traditional forms of state regulation and revealing the changing agency of the non-state in government. The rapid spread of Gen Z activism is an indicator of a significant restructuring of political capital where influence is exercised simultaneously in both formal institutions and online infrastructures, which create both new possibilities and complex issues for state actors who want to participate with non-state actors. The full understanding of these dynamics is essential to policymakers, researchers, and other international stakeholders who strive to maneuver in the new landscape of youth-led, digitally mediated activism and its implications for state power, democratic responsibility, and digital governance in the twenty-first century.

## References

- African Union. (2006). *African Youth Charter*. African Union Commission. <https://au.int/en/youth-development>
- Alam, I. (2025). The role of Generation Z in shaping modern politics. *International Journal of Multidisciplinary Conference Proceedings*. <https://www.ijmcp.com/index.php/ijmcp/article/view/230>
- Amnesty International, & Human Rights Watch. (2025). *Nepal: Uphold rights and rule of law in post protest period*. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa31/0297/2025/en/>
- Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India. (2020). *Supreme Court of India*.

- Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). (2017). *ASEAN Youth Development Index Report*. ASEAN Secretariat. <https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/First-ASEAN-Youth-Development-Index.pdf>
- Bhattarai, S. K. (2025). *Navigating online media and controlling cybercrime & defamation in Nepal*.
- Castells, M. (2012). *Networks of outrage and hope: Social movements in the internet age*. Wiley.
- Chenoweth, E., & Shay. (2022). *NAVCO 2.1 update*.
- Commonwealth Secretariat. (n.d.). *Youth*. <https://thecommonwealth.org/our-work/youth>
- Couldry, N., & Mejias, U. A. (2019). *The costs of connection: How data is colonizing human life and appropriating it for capitalism*. Stanford University Press.
- Coward, S. K., & Pomerantz, J. D. (2022). Internet shutdowns and right to information. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 44(2), 301–329.
- Dahal, Rajib, Doctrine of Necessity and its Application in Nepalese Constitutional Law-An Overview (April 9, 2012). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2037059> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2037059>
- Deen Freelon, C. D., McIlwain, C. D., & Clark, M. D. (2017). Beyond the hashtags. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 61(9), 1150–1166.
- Digital Rights Nepal. (2024). *State of digital rights and safety in Nepal 2024*. <https://digitalrightsnepal.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/STATE-OF-DIGITAL-RIGHTS-AND-SAFETY-IN-NEPAL-2024-1-1-2.pdf>
- Dieterich, C., Landrin, S., & Pedroletti, B. (2025, September 29). Asia's Gen Z rises up against entrenched political elites. *Le Monde*. [https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/09/29/asia-s-gen-z-rises-up-against-entrenched-political-elites\\_6745909\\_4.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/09/29/asia-s-gen-z-rises-up-against-entrenched-political-elites_6745909_4.html)
- Duncombe, S., & Harrebye, S. (2022). The Copenhagen experiment: Testing creative vs. conventional activism. *Social Movement Studies*, 21(6), 741–765.
- Gautam, D., Sapkota, S., & Baral, K. (2025). Digital activism and crisis in Nepal. *Kalika Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies*, 7, 117–129.
- German Marshall Fund of the United States. (2021). *Gen Z and changing transatlantic foreign policy perceptions*. <https://www.gmfus.org/news/gen-z-and-changing-transatlantic-foreign-policy-perceptions>
- Gillespie, T. (2018). *Custodians of the internet: Platforms, content moderation, and the hidden decisions that shape social media*. Yale University Press.
- Goodwin, J. (2001). *No other way out: States and revolutionary movements, 1945–1991*. Cambridge University Press.
- Howard, P. N., & Hussain, M. M. (2020). Digital media and political communication. In *the Routledge handbook of political communication*.
- Jackson, S. J., Bailey, M., & Foucault Welles, B. (2016). #Hashtag activism. *Social Movement Studies*, 15(1), 1–17.
- Jenkins, C. (1983). Resource mobilization theory. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 9, 527–554.

- Kowske, K. M., Rasch, R., & Wiley, J. (2010). Millennials' (lack of) attitude problem. KC, A. (2025, November 5). Gen Z activism: Global youth protests & connected rebellion. *Gurkha Technology*. <https://gurkhatech.com/gen-z-activism-global-movements/>
- McKinsey & Company. (2018). *True Gen: Generation Z and its implications for companies*.
- McKinsey & Company. (2025, June 17). *Mind the gap: Why Gen Z consumers are a force to reckon with*. <https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/consumer-packaged-goods/our-insights/state-of-consumer>
- Mbugua, J. (2025). Why Kenya's Gen Z has taken to the streets. *Journal of Democracy*.
- Ombuor, R. (2025). Art as activism in Kenya's protests. *The Conversation*.
- Pickard, S. (2020). *Politics, protest and young people*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pichler, S., Kohli, C., & Granitz, N. (2021). DITTO for Gen Z. *Business Horizons*, 64(5), 599–610. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2021.02.021>
- Ratcliffe, R. (2025). One Piece flag and Gen Z protests. *The Guardian*.
- Robinson, W. I. (2000). Globalization and Wallerstein. *International Sociology*, 15(2), 171–196.
- Sastramidjaja, Y. (2024). Rhizomatic protest and digital refuge. In *The Palgrave handbook of political norms in Southeast Asia* (pp. 501–520). Springer. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9655-1\\_29](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9655-1_29)
- Sharma, M., Kaushal, D., & Joshi, S. (2023). Adverse effect of social media on Gen Z users' behavior. *Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services*, 72, 103256. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jretconser.2023.103256>
- Sloam, J. (2014). The outraged young. *Information, Communication & Society*, 17(2), 217–231.
- Surfshark. (2024). *Internet shutdowns in 2024: A global overview*.
- Thapa, S. B. (2026). The global wave of Gen Z activism. *Lex Localis*. <https://lex-localis.org/index.php/LexLocalis/article/view/803400>
- Timalsina, S. K., & Shrestha, S. K. (2025). Hidden politics behind the Gen Z movement. *Educational Journal*, 4(2), 64–72. <https://doi.org/10.3126/ej.v4i2.88527>
- Times of India. (2025). Nepal unrest and KP Sharma Oli's resignation. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/>
- Tisdall, E. K. M., & Cuevas-Parra, P. (2022). Youth participation rights. *International Journal of Human Rights*, 26(5), 792–810.
- Tufekci, Z. (2015). Twitter and tear gas. *Perspectives on Politics*, 13(4), 837–859.
- Twenge, J. M., & Martin, G. N. (2020). Digital media and psychological well-being. *Journal of Adolescence*, 79, 91–102.
- United Nations. (1989). *Convention on the Rights of the Child* (Article 1).
- Van Dijck, J. (2013). *The culture of connectivity: A critical history of social media*. Oxford University Press.
- Wike, R. (2022). *Social media and democracy*. Pew Research Center.
- Zuboff, S. (2019). *The age of surveillance capitalism*. PublicAffairs.