Role of Non-State Actors in National Security

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Abstract
Globalization has elevated the role of non-state actors (NSAs) in national security. This article underscores the need to acknowledge the influence of NSAs on international relations and national security. It discusses the role of NSAs only in democratic states with limited government, excluding the totalitarian and authoritarian states, as they blur the private-public distinction or restrict NSAs. The paper follows a qualitative methodology depending on the scholarly credibility of sources, recency, and relevance. The sources include expert interviews as primary data sources and relevant academic literature and case studies as secondary data sources. It employs thematic analysis for examining the data, enabling a nuanced investigation of the evolving influence of NSAs. The theoretical foundation distinguishes two primary NSA categories: private-sector corporate actors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including global social movements (GSMs). Likewise, it investigates how NSAs extend their influence beyond conventional territorial boundaries such as cyber threats, climate threats, and global policy making. The findings highlight the critical role of non-state actors in shaping contemporary national security paradigms through various case studies, offering insights for policymakers.

Keywords: Non-state actors, national security, international relations, policymaking, globalization

Introduction
The role of Non-state actors in the international arena as experts in agenda-setting cannot be ignored. NSA involvement has proliferated after WWII due to the establishment of various international regimes, and the growth of transnational advocacy networks. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, many non-state actors expanded their activities where regional dynamics played a vital role (Josselin & Wallace, 2001). The diverse reach of NSAs includes mass membership, professional standing and expertise, financial strength or employment-generating capacity, and access to international institutions and national governments. Lately, there has been a growth in the opinion that NSAs require proper inclusion in international regimes such as the World Bank, WTO, and IMF (Josselin & Wallace, 2001). Contemporary development and
multipolarity have made it impossible to ignore NSA's influence in multilateral diplomacy. They help mold emerging international regimes alongside foreign policy-makers even in state-centric dimensions dominated by national policy networks such as national security (Josselin & Wallace, 2001).

NSAs have transitioned into moral entrepreneurs by homogenizing their objectives with the dynamics of international legal order as it remains the viable forum to exert influence (Colonomos, 2001). For instance, NGOs such as Amnesty International have been continually expanding their political reach via front groups making it indispensable for human rights advocacy and policymaking. Prominent NSA strategy in global politics includes lobbying (direct and indirect), access to marketing, and technology access for TNCs or MNCs (Bieler et al., 2004). Meanwhile, armed NSAs (terrorist groups, or private militia) often consider violent threats. Therefore, NSAs and their impact require a critical outlook to account for their impact in various national security dimensions as they pose significant problems for states and international institutions. Thus, this paper aims to analyze the role of a variety of NSA's impact and their extended effect on national security Bieler et al., 2004).

Theoretical Considerations
For this study, it adopts the definition given by Josselin & Wallace (2001) viewing NSAs as: actors largely or entirely autonomous from central government funding and control who emanate from civil society, the market economy, or from political impulses beyond state control and direction operating as or participating in networks that extend across the boundaries of two or more states thus engaging in 'transnational' relations, linking political systems, economies, societies and acting in ways which affect political outcomes, either within one or more states or international institutionseither purposefully or semi-purposefully, either as their primary objective or as one aspect of their activities (p. 4).

Likewise, the study considers the broad nature of NSA activities and follows the classification provided by Higgot, Underhill & Bieler (2004) who primarily divide NSAs into the Private Sector and contemporary global social movements as provided below in Fig. 1 (p. 1-2). NSA's activities might be influenced by state coercion and censorship. Therefore, this study considers the Hedley Bull legitimization concept reinforced by Higgot, Underhill & Bieler (Bull 1977; Higgot et al., 2004). It considers the activities of NSAs in democratic states only with limited government, excluding the totalitarian and authoritarian states, as they blur the private-public distinction or restrict NSAs (Bieler et al., 2004).

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**Fig. 1: Classification of Non-state Actors**

*Source: Prepared by the Author based on Higgot, Underhill & Bieler (2004)*
In terms of theoretical models in IR for NSAs, Idealists view NGOs as primary actors to topple authoritarian states while advocates of globalization consider private social actors (MNCs or TNCs) as building blocks of international solidarity. Meanwhile, Hard-line Realists argue NGOs disguise the national interests of a particular state, or rival national solidarity and stability. However, both come to opine transnational economic actors propel modernization. Since democratic states have promoted cross-border trade and investment NSAs have developed international networks for network diplomacy and substantial capital control. However, NSAs need to secure donors for resources while states continue to emphasize internal security and control. Policy advocacy effectively depicts this friction. Thus, this study takes a civil society empowerment approach to analyze the NSAs influence furnished by Kendall W. Stiles (2005) considering the proliferation of NSAs and the relative weakness of LDCs. Stiles (2005) argues, that in recent times, NSAs, particularly NGOs are not required to stitch a security strategy that promotes democratic development. It shows that the policies reflect their long-standing interests in grassroots development rather than widespread social welfare (Stiles, 2005).

Indeed, securitization theory remains state-centric concerning national security since the state is the main actor but NSAs are increasingly leveraging their position as securitizing actors, securitizing agents, or even security practitioners (Barthwal-Datta, 2012). Studies on security practices within the realm of securitization theory still exclude NSAs and, importantly, activities formally not in line with the state security architecture. Currently, national security concerns encompass broader threats outside military-political contentions (Barthwal-Datta, 2012). For instance, multiple NSAs work to mitigate non-military and human security issues in South Asia at the sub-state level often involving marginalized communities. In this light, this study assumes securitization theory ought to include NSAs in security dynamics outside conventional state-led practices to properly address contemporary national security concerns (Barthwal-Datta, 2012).

Methodology and Chapterization
This study follows a qualitative methodology with a historical and analytical approach (Fig. 2). The epistemology is primarily pragmatic integrating available perspectives to interpret the available information. The sources include expert interviews as primary data sources and relevant academic literature and case studies as secondary data sources based on credibility, recency, and relevance to the research objectives. It employs thematic analysis for examining the data, enabling a nuanced investigation of the changing landscape of security studies and the impact of NSAs. Based on specific theoretical considerations, the paper discusses the influence of NSAs in global policymaking extending to non-traditional security dimensions, such as climate and cyber threats. Then, I examine relevant case studies effectively depicting the nature and role of relevant NSAs in formulating policies related to various dimensions of human and national security. Consequently, the relevant findings are summarised in the final chapter with recommendations for the stakeholders to consider the role of the NSA in national security.
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Fig 2: Conceptual Framework and Research Design
Source: Prepared by the Author
Non-State Actors in Global Governance

Background
Shaw (1995) argues current world dynamics depict its outreach through global institutions where the NSA has a substantial impact. Peterson (2003) contradicts Shaw (1995) holding that NSAs are largely decentralized without coherence and common vision yet their activities harness uniform methods of influence such as mass mobilization. They make coordination and maximization of influence possible through various network corridors giving rise to global network diplomacy outside conventional nation-state diplomatic processes where actors are primarily actors which Wapner (1995) terms ‘world civic politics’. These developments have led the international arena to shift from the interaction between and among the same actors to multiple actors such as NSAs. Stiles (2005) finds that NSAs will continue to affect state dynamics until their funding sources remain uncontested and so long as developing states have a debt burden NSAs will continue to engage in policy lobbying in global governance (Stiles, 2005).

Likewise, if we consider economy-oriented NSAs (TNCs & MNCs), they may have direct and indirect power (Josselin & Wallace, 2001). For instance, corporations may exercise direct power when they mobilise resources because of their lobbying, and institutional access. Meanwhile, NSAs construct the normative context which differentiates fair and unfair practices in competition. These practices also have a global impact on policymaking and in turn, draw focus to specific aspects of national security. Thus, this chapter discusses the NSA’s capacity to delineate goal-oriented policies which further extends to security threats based on the civil society empowerment model by Stiles (Stiles, 2005).

Non-State Actors Diplomacy
The concept of diplomacy has evolved into a response to issues about spaces of proclaimed sovereignty but also incorporates non-traditional security concerns like climate negotiations, and debt cancellation. Since states do not control social capital alone NSAs have been engaged in these responses to global issues which has developed their strain of multi-track diplomacy (Balzacq et al., 2019). The downfall of the regalian view of diplomacy has allowed NSAs diplomatic access to representation, negotiation, and information gathering. Nowadays, parallel negotiations exist among multiple actors in multi-track diplomacy (Guilbaud, 2020). For instance, Track 1 includes governments and leaders of quasi-governmental groups while NSAs negotiate in both Track 2 and 3 depending on their influence, goals, and objectives. This widely impacts the national security policies that the state or the global order envisions. State and NSA interaction in national policies are often systemic with regularity and reciprocity but in the international arena, they contest for power as international politics largely remains state-led fora under international law (Puig & Bakhtiari, 2021). Nonetheless, NSAs are diverse and encompass various areas of activities so international intergovernmental organizations have started considering NSAs in their policy circles including traditional security concerns (Devine, 2020). It is the function of normative narrative development by NSAs that makes opposing forces believe that they are impartial and unbiased. Hence, this provides the fertile ground for conducting multi-track diplomacy with multiple actors creating an environment for poly-lateral diplomatic corridors including public-private collaboration to swiftly resolve conflict (Interpeace, 2023) (Fig. 3).
The collaboration in international negotiations allows NSAs to effectively draft international standards. For instance, Human Rights Watch was an effective partner in campaigns against land mines which is a traditional state-centric security concern (Coleman, 2001). NSAs are offered spaces in these discussions based on their expertise and their representativeness of the sectorial interests of a wide range of groups and communities. As NSAs continue to involve transnational interlocutors they have started to raise departments to specifically foster state-organization and organization-organization relations mirroring external affairs ministries of any government. For instance, doing so allows actors like MNCs to gain markets and licenses, and to subdue crises in national, regional, and international security architecture for smooth functioning (Stone, 2001). Similarly, NGOs may employ denunciation and boycotting campaigns for such causes as they can engage easily in public diplomacy by circulating information that appeals to public opinion. This emanates in the form of coalitions and pre-established networks of NGOs, associations, and transnational organizations creating network diplomacy (Guilbaud, 2020). For instance, TRIPS (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) is adopted by every state and it regulates IP standards in an intergovernmental model but it was created via a coalition of American Intellectual Property Committee, with Japanese and European business associations (Guilbaud, 2020). This effectively demonstrates the growing role of NSAs in creating and directing international and national regimes.

Non-State Actors in Global Policy Making

NSAs normally involved in global policy-making include think tanks. Their opinion and reports testify to the current standing and concerns of the world order and possible ways to approach the situation in light of globalization. They can persuade the political, social, and economic blocs in globalization through transnational policy communities and networks for global integration. The rise of minilateral alliances in the Indo-Pacific and their objective to include TNCs and MNCs for specific objective-oriented alliances shows how NSAs are engaged in creating regional blocs. The multipolarity and rise of middle powers to address a global audience is only possible if they are allied with actors who have a global outreach. Therefore, NSAs are becoming evident in policy roles.
Soroos (1991) evaluates this development and raises three fundamental issues for the need for NSA involvement in global policy discussions. Soroos (1991) finds that NSAs are engaged in transboundary problems (pollution or refugees), common property problems (Oceans, Atmosphere), and simultaneous problems (Welfare, Urbanization) and these are the policy issues of the current world. Hence, it has created a viable ground for soft power considerations for NSAs against the hard authority of states and intergovernmental organizations (Soroos, 1991). However, states have introduced various regulatory frameworks to keep NSAs in check by constricting their influence on domestic and global policy but they have adapted to these restrictions. Heiss (2023) has developed a programmatic flexibility model to explain how NSAs adjust their strategies without changing their core mission and still influence policies and national and global levels (Fig. 4).

Heiss (2023) provides that depending on the variables such as resource configurations, institutional arrangements, and mission pressures NSAs strategize their influence in the long run. Resource configurations (funding and organizational culture) impact efficiency while institutional constraints (legal, political, cultural constraints) shape up their approach to a particular target country which may lead to geographic forum shopping depending on the institutional arrangements (Heiss, 2023). Therefore, NSAs utilize programmatic flexibility to not lose their mission focus. For instance, NSAs with steady funds and strong coalitions will have a positive resource configuration and fewer constraints in adapting to the target countries' regulatory framework offering programmatic flexibility.

Advocacy groups are more adept at navigating rigid institutional structures maintaining their mission attaining their objectives, and exerting influence on policy matters both domestically and globally due to programmatic flexibility. NSAs with steady funding are in a better position to manage financial setbacks resulting from regulations prohibiting foreign funding. Some NSAs also establish local offices in neighboring countries with more lenient regulations to reallocate their resources in response to legal crackdowns (Heiss, 2023). In contrast, organizations with limited flexibility struggle to respond effectively to changes in the

![Programmatic Flexibility Model Pursued by NSAs](source: Prepared by Andrew Heiss (2023))
institutional landscape of their target countries, often resulting in loss of access, and ultimately failing to achieve their goals.

**NSAs and Non-traditional Security Threats**

Non-traditional security threats include transnational, political, and socio-economic challenges that are not necessarily driven directly through military threats. Although states build consensus to mitigate these dimensions of human security, NSAs are the ones who have been constantly working to solve these issues (Hirsch Ballin et al., 2020). These difficulties can cause social and political unrest, endangering the state's solidarity. Non-traditional threats require cooperative responses in contrast to coercive methods in traditional security responses at the regional and global levels (demonstrated in the subsequent sections with climate and cyber threats as examples). The following Figure 5 represents the main dimensions of NSA's activities in non-traditional security threats.

![Fig. 5: Dimensions of Non-traditional Security Threats Managed by NSAs](image)

*Source: Prepared by the Author*
Non-state Actors have various mechanisms to solve these issues. Some of them are as follows:

**i. Expertise and Specialization:** It is common for non-state actors to have specialist knowledge and experience in fields related to non-traditional security risks. Environmental non-governmental organizations possess vast knowledge of climate change and ecological preservation, whereas IT companies are well-versed in cybersecurity. Because of their experience, non-state actors can carry out investigations, offer creative solutions, and offer important insights that might not be easily found in official organizations. Their area of expertise is crucial for efficiently handling difficult, unconventional problems (Hirsch Ballin et al., 2020).

**ii. Flexibility and Adaptability:** When it comes to their operations, non-state entities are typically more adaptive and agile than states. They are not hampered by the bureaucratic red tape that frequently impedes state-led actions, allowing them to react quickly to new threats, situations, and problems (Hirsch Ballin et al., 2020).

**iii. Advocacy and Public Awareness:** Increasing public awareness of non-traditional security issues is mostly the responsibility of non-state actors. Policymakers and the general public can be successfully informed about the urgency of these concerns by NGOs, advocacy groups, and civil society organizations (Hirsch Ballin et al., 2020).

**iv. Global Networks and Collaborative Initiatives:** International cooperation is essential because non-traditional security threats frequently cross state lines. Non-state actors are frequently in a better position to close the gaps and encourage collaboration between organizations that might not otherwise be able to collaborate successfully (Hirsch Ballin et al., 2020).

**v. Data Gathering and Analysis:** Non-state actors often engage in data collection and analysis, providing valuable insights into the nature and impact of non-traditional security threats. This information is crucial for evidence-based policymaking (Hirsch Ballin et al., 2020).

**vi. Assistance and Conflict Resolution:** International cooperation is essential because non-traditional security threats frequently cross state lines. Non-state actors are frequently in a better position to close the gaps and encourage collaboration between organizations that might not otherwise be able to collaborate successfully (Hirsch Ballin et al., 2020).

**vii. Public-Private Partnerships:** Public-private partnerships combine the resources and authority of the public sector with the creativity and efficiency of the private sector to better address sophisticated non-traditional security threats (Hirsch Ballin et al., 2020).

**viii. Community Engagement and Resilience Building:** Reducing vulnerabilities and improving local capacity to respond effectively are achieved by empowering communities to deal with non-traditional security threats. Non-state actors can be quite helpful in this situation because they frequently have intimate relationships with these communities (Hirsch Ballin et al., 2020).
Cyber Threats
Cyber threats comprise arguably most of the vulnerabilities and affect every group globally via mistrust, ignorance, inefficiencies, and misunderstanding. The 'apocalypse' of cyber threats includes more private actors than state actors (Cook, 2010). Therefore, states alone cannot be cyber-resilient without cooperating with various groups of NSAs. The cooperation enables states to have a broader reach to address the urgency to protect critical cyber infrastructure from threats such as disinformation, hacking, and more (Niyonzigira, 2023). Economically poor nations have weaker cyber infrastructures, thus, they naturally partner with NSAs to develop them. Hence, NSAs are directly engaged in developing cyber infrastructures ranging from hardware and software issues to effective and functional cyber policies to counter threats (Niyonzigira, 2023). For instance, in the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) collaborates with private companies through programs like the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (ECS) to share classified threat information. This partnership enhances the nation's collective defense against cyber threats.

Nevertheless, the use of technology rises it also the digital footprint leading to the increment of areas where threats can occur. It can also negatively impact NSA activities, especially affecting organization and community relationships in their target locations. Such consequences can compromise sensitive data and disrupt services and support from the donor agencies. Thus, NSAs seem to focus on five thematic areas to improve their cyber resilience internally and externally. For instance, the USAID report in Kosovo demonstrated that NSAs have played a vital role in improving cyber resiliency in Kosovo by improving these five areas namely governance, technical implementation of procedures, monitoring of security and information systems, testing and auditing, and staff training and awareness (Niyonzigira, 2023). Similarly, The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) develop global cybersecurity standards. These standards are widely adopted by governments and organizations to improve their cybersecurity practices. Thus, NSA activities can create a security blanket within the country by working with state governments. They can also exert external influence when they work in policy networks such as IEC and ISO.

Climate Threats
NSAs are major players in climate governance and contribute majorly to contemporary mitigation initiatives at all levels (Fig. 6). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol had relatively modest aspirations for engaging NSAs in climate threats because climate change legislation relied on the states authority to convert emission reduction targets into reality (Hale, 2018). NSAs were only categorized as observers in multilateral negotiations as subjects of national governments. Nonetheless, the idealized state-led climate governance has never been fully embraced by the UNFCCC system or other international environmental agreements (Kuyper et al., 2018). Instead, even the more centralized facets of the climate regime could be described as pursuing a hybrid governance model that offers ample scope for non-state actors' experimentation.

Paris Agreement has further reinforced the role of NSAs in assessing ambition, execution, and adherence to emission reduction goals (Rajavuori, 2021). The growth climate climate-oriented NSAs are often referred to as hybrid multilateralism that reflects state and non-state actors in the evolving landscape of international climate cooperation (Kuyper et al., 2018).
This shift is often perceived positively as an opportunity to stimulate transnational governance arrangements in the absence of prompt government action, through mechanisms like voluntary emission reduction commitments from companies, industry-wide certification programs, activist campaigns, and subnational regulatory initiatives, among other forms of decentralized governance (Hale, 2018). However, despite NSAs taking on roles that complement or, in some instances, substitute national mitigation efforts, NSA-driven governance faces significant conceptual, institutional, and practical challenges that raise doubts about its operational rationale and consequences (Rajavuori, 2021).

![Fig. 6: Critical Intersection of Climate Threats with Security Issues](source)

In terms of conceptual considerations, the mitigation efforts undertaken by non-state actors (NSAs) can be likened to the 'waterbed effect,' a phenomenon often associated with emission-trading schemes (Hickmann & Elsässer, 2020). Here, voluntary emission reductions by some NSAs can potentially ease the burden on states in achieving their reduction targets. However, it's important to note that while voluntary initiatives might enable states to exceed their targets or bolster their commitment, this is not guaranteed (Hickmann & Elsässer, 2020). Furthermore, there can be resistance and hindrance from certain NSAs. For instance, the establishment, financing, and operation of climate change counter-movement organizations represent a form of NSA-driven climate governance, much like the climate advocacy carried out by international NGOs such as Greenpeace (Hickmann & Elsässer, 2020). Differentiating between NSA-led actions and state-centric governance efforts is challenging, as many non-state initiatives either depend on the state's financial and regulatory framework or take the form of public-private collaborations. Additionally, practical challenges related to transparency, impact assessment, and legitimacy in NSA-driven governance are substantial. Ensuring the
fulfillment of corporate climate pledges, for example, has proven to be a complex task, as has the prevention of double-counting potential emission reductions (Hickmann & Elsässer, 2020).

Moreover, non-state actors, often represented by civil society, frequently engage in activist endeavours. This commonly involves staging rallies and disruptive actions aimed at gaining attention through media coverage and challenging the status quo in politics (Hickmann & Elsässer, 2020). While protests are a common feature of transnational politics, they hold a significant role in climate governance, as evidenced during the Copenhagen COP in 2009, where civil society mobilized in large numbers to challenge exclusionary negotiation practices. On December 12, 2009, approximately 100,000 participants publicly voiced their opposition to the marginalization of certain perspectives in the negotiations (Hickmann & Elsässer, 2020).

**Analysis of Case Studies of NSA in National Security**

The growth in the number of non-state actors is not in itself a good or a bad development in terms of security, and it does not automatically weaken state authority. However, the combination of a variety of actors and ongoing technological developments makes it more difficult to determine the origin of threats (d’Aspremont et al., 2015). Therefore, NSAs are involved in various dimensions of national security depending on their areas of work. The following figure represents the areas of influence that NSAs can have at various levels. It can be categorized into four dimensions namely geographical, danger, substantive, and reference (Fig. 7).

![Fig. 7: National Security Dimensions and NSAs Influence](source: Prepared by Hirsch Ballin et al., 2020)

The substantive dimension of security concerns specific domains where security threats are observed. In the 1950s and 1960s, military threats dominated the security discourse, while
economic, ecological, and humanitarian issues have come to the forefront in the succeeding decades (Hirsch Ballin et al., 2020). The protection, freedom, and development of individuals in society is central to the concept of human security and is closely linked to a full realization of human rights (Stone, 2001). The reference dimension of the concept of security is whose security needs to be ensured: the nation state’s, the society’s, or the individual’s. The extension of the referent object means that the conventional role of international law in promoting and ensuring peace and security must likewise be expanded (Barthwal-Datta, 2012).

The levels of geographic scale to which security policy applies are determined by the geographical dimension of the concept of security (Hirsch Ballin et al., 2020). Is it the territory of a state, predicated on the notion that domestic and foreign policy are inherently distinct and that the state’s boundaries coincide with that of the society? This defensive ‘container model’ of security has long been inadequate (Hirsch Ballin et al., 2020). The expansion of the geographical dimension has brought increased attention to regional, international, and global security complexes, in which states are so interconnected that their national security cannot be considered separately from the security of other states (Hirsch Ballin et al., 2020).

The concept of security has expanded to encompass various interpretations of danger. It makes a big difference whether a security is viewed as the absence of a military threat to a clearly defined territory or as the reduction of economic vulnerability in a globalized world (Barthwal-Datta, 2012). Likewise, the mitigation of risks and insecurity even before there is any question of an acute threat. Security is increasingly also connected with the far more elusive violence of non-state actors. It is even associated with diffuse dangers without any identifiable actor with hostile intentions (Barthwal-Datta, 2012). Subjective perceptions including feelings of hope, humiliation, or fear play a crucial role in the securitization of threats, vulnerabilities, and risks. The following subchapters analyze the role of NSAs in complementing the state in mitigating these threats to compose a strong national security architecture (Barthwal-Datta, 2012).

**Maiti Nepal and Shakti Samuha in Nepal**

Human trafficking poses a threat to state security and is a source of insecurity to vulnerable and affected individuals and communities. It presents a fundamental challenge to the state’s authority, legitimacy, and control over sovereign territory and state borders. Traffickers use their connections with politicians, businessmen, state officials, police, customs officials, and border police to facilitate trafficking and therefore it thrives on corruption. There is ample evidence to suggest the links between drug trafficking, insurgent guerrilla groups, terrorists, and paramilitary forces (Barthwal-Datta, 2012). Human trafficking is another activity with which such groups have engaged globally. For over two decades, NGOs in Nepal have been raising human trafficking as a significant threat to vulnerable groups in the country, and also highlighting the deep insecurities victims continue to face even after being rescued. UN agencies such as UNIFEM South Asia and UNICEF have clearly defined human trafficking as a Human Security issue, and local NGOs who collaborate with these agencies have embraced the terminology (Barthwal-Datta, 2012).

Shakti Samuha works to combat trafficking by providing prevention, care, support, and advocacy services. It operates a safe shelter home in Kathmandu for trafficking survivors and an emergency shelter for street/working and young children (SWCYP) in Pokhara (Barthwal-Datta, 2012). The organization also offers outreach programs for at-risk communities such as
young girls and women working in the entertainment and commercial sex industry, dance bars, and massage parlors as well as in domestic servitude in the country and provides information on prevention, protection, and risk reduction, counselling, and medical support (Barthwal-Datta, 2012). Shakti Samuha also conducts rescue operations and offers legal support to trafficking survivors. It facilitates vocational training for survivors, providing livelihood opportunities and seed money for small businesses. It also engages in advocacy with the media, government agencies such as the Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare (MWCSW), and the police (Barthwal-Datta, 2012).

Maiti Nepal is another leading anti-trafficking NGO in Nepal, supported by organizations such as ECPAT International, Friends of Maiti Nepal, and the CarMax Foundation. The organization works extensively in the area of prevention through its ‘prevention homes’, which provide temporary shelter to girls deemed to be at ‘high risk’ of being trafficked (Barthwal-Datta, 2012). It also provides information on safe migration, how to protect themselves against trafficking and sexually transmitted infections including HIV, and training in life skills and income generation, primary health care support, counselling, and non-formal education. Along the India-Nepal border, Maiti Nepal has ten ‘transit homes’ for rescued trafficking survivors and also for those intercepted in trafficking (Barthwal-Datta, 2012). These homes provide medical attention and counseling to rescued individuals as well as help in locating their families. Surveillance teams at these transit homes work closely with the border police, responding quickly to requests for assistance by actual or even potential victims. Its rehabilitation center in Kathmandu accommodates survivors of domestic violence and rape, street children, and trafficked children and women (Barthwal-Datta, 2012).

As members of AATWIN, both Shakti Samuha and Maiti Nepal engage in lobbying activities to influence the state’s anti-trafficking policies towards adopting a more human rights-oriented approach. In addition to its member organizations, it collaborates with the National Task Force on Trafficking (NTF) and District Task Forces (DTFs) formed by the state to combat trafficking, as well as with other state institutions such as MWCSW, and other anti-trafficking networks such as GAATW (Barthwal-Datta, 2012). Shakti Samuha and Maiti Nepal are also members of NNGAT, which focuses on girl trafficking for sexual exploitation and comprises local and national NGOs and capacity-building organizations (Barthwal-Datta, 2012).

**NSA Influence on Mexican Soda Tax**

Mexico imposed a soda tax of 1 Mexican Peso (MXP) per litre in January 2014. The soda tax was reintroduced in 2013 as part of the new president's program, following its original 2012 proposal. The beliefs surrounding the underlying driving forces behind the soda tax were perceived in two ways based on the socio-political conditions in Mexico at the time. First, it was seen as a government initiative to secure budgets and expenditure levels and, second, as an opportunity for obesity to get on the policy agenda. Besides gaining further support from the public, groups of civil societies, and academics, the positive framing was a move by the federal government to increase its popularity (Carriedo et al., 2020).

The policy outcomes were influenced by various factors during the process of developing a soda tax policy in Mexico. It was primarily motivated by the government’s need to increase revenues for public expenditure, as has also been observed in the case of the Philippines and the Pacific Islands (Carriedo et al., 2020). Using health evidence, international organizations,
academics, and civil society supported it. However, it was highly challenged by the food and beverages industry. National media debates on the topic increased public awareness of obesity and the negative health effects of high SSB consumption as well as increased support for the soda tax (Carriedo et al., 2020).

The tactics employed by NSAs to sway public opinion against the soda tax were similar to those employed by F&BI to oppose other health-related legislation that aimed to reduce alcohol and tobacco consumption (Carriedo et al., 2020). These included refuting scientific data, establishing industry-funded front groups, intense lobbying of politicians, participating in the formulation of government policy, utilizing media tactics to portray the soda tax negatively, and funding research and organizations. This occurred at the time that the policy was being developed and even after the soda tax was implemented and proved to be successful. These activities were strongly contested by academic and civil society coalitions supporting the tax (Carriedo et al., 2020).

Throughout the policy debate, the power dynamics shifted. The F&BI was deeply involved and collaborated with the government throughout, which promoted deliberate distractions such as public-private partnerships (Carriedo et al., 2020). F&BI was actively involved in the soda tax policy development and the monitoring and evaluation platform (OMENT). The F&BI corporate strategies focus on increasing brand loyalty, particularly among disadvantaged populations, and on increasing the visibility of corporate social actions by participating in other social programmes (Carriedo et al., 2020). This conflicts with the vested commercial interest of corporations, in which commercial fiduciary duties to their shareholders are above any social responsibility actions (Carriedo et al., 2020).

SSB companies see soda tax policies as threats. In October 2016, the leaked Coca-Cola Company documents revealed their preoccupation with responding to such policies through a public policy risk matrix lobby focus and a global political strategy (Carriedo et al., 2020). As a result, the F&BI has invested in actions to manage or mitigate the reputational and economic risks, using marketing campaigns, investing in reformulation and new products, and changing their beverage portfolios and pricing. Through PPPs, the F&BI linked corporate social responsibility actions to social policy actions, used for the negotiation of fiscal benefits (Carriedo et al., 2020).

This shows how NSAs can be engaged in persuading national governments to create a ripple effect in global health policies. In this case, civil society groups were in favour of implementing the soda tax while commercial actors deferred because of their economic interests. For instance, null impacts were reported in industry-funded reports and used to build a conflicting evidence base. Thus, NSAs are effectively engaged in tailoring the means and resources of states to address national security concerns.

NSA and Migration Diplomacy in UAE

The UAE’s migration diplomacy strategy, particularly its bilateral agreements with labour-sending countries and involvement with international organizations, has traditionally been the domain of state actors. Historically, this diplomacy focused on regional governance and multilateral initiatives within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). However, the influence of non-state actors in this diplomacy, specifically in the context of labour migration is paramount. Several non-state actors play crucial roles in shaping this migration diplomacy for their benefit (Froilan & Gerasimos, 2021).
The UAE government established the Tadbeer centres to regulate the recruitment and management of migrant domestic workers. These centres are portrayed as public-private partnerships, with some being wholly owned by Emirati nationals and others involving expatriate business partners (Froilan & Gerasimos, 2021). They have been created to indirectly control and regulate recruitment costs, processes, and placement of migrant domestic workers. NGOs and foreign consulting firms have influenced the UAE's migration diplomacy. Human rights organizations like have consistently pressured the UAE regarding labour migration issues. They have highlighted problems such as limited access to justice, contract slavery, debt bondage, and unethical recruitment practices under the kafala sponsorship system. In recent times, the MFA has evolved into a strategic non-state partner of the UAE, participating as an observer in interregional migration dialogues like the Abu Dhabi Dialogue (Froilan & Gerasimos, 2021). This partnership reflects the UAE's effort to enhance its global image as a multilateral player in governing labour migration in the Asia-Gulf corridor. This can be seen as an extension of NSAs in human security dimensions (Froilan & Gerasimos, 2021).

**Manavsewa Ashram as Human Security Model in Nepal**

Established in Hetauda, Nepal, in 2012, the Manavsewa Ashram is a non-profit social organization with a mission to transform Nepal into a 'street people free country' by providing aid to marginalized individuals, including those who are vulnerable, impoverished, disabled, homeless, and mentally challenged, residing on the streets. Their goals encompass ensuring access to fundamental necessities such as food, clothing, and shelter, fostering supportive environments for road-dependent populations, and promoting humanistic values within society. Additionally, they seek to initiate self-reliant programs, deliver mental health services, cater to the needs of senior citizens, and address loose animal management concerns nationwide. In the short term, their focus remains on aiding those in immediate distress while laying the groundwork for the proclamation of Nepal as a road-dependent unmanned nation (Ramjee Adhikari, Personal Communications, 2023)

Notably, the Manavsewa Ashram, nominated for a UN Human Rights award, extends its reach beyond national borders, participating in the rescue and relocation of foreign nationals from various countries. This international outreach includes the successful repatriation of individuals like Alain Jean Quemener, a French citizen, as well as Anna Shopie, a 51-year-old American citizen, who found herself stranded in Nepal due to the theft of her passport in Thamel. By collaborating closely with the Nepal Police, the Manavseva Ashram has demonstrated its capacity to influence the state, encouraging the development of bills related to human security, especially concerning women, children, and the elderly. It has effectively established a comprehensive human security model that holds promise for Nepal in enhancing the overall quality of life for its citizens (Ramjee Adhikari, Personal Communications, 2023).

**Conclusion**

This paper offers a comprehensive introduction to the pivotal role of Non-State Actors (NSAs) in the intricate landscape of international relations and global governance. It traces the historical evolution and diversification of NSAs, from their post-World War II expansion to their current engagement across various sectors, emphasizing the importance of incorporating NSAs into international regimes, even in traditionally state-centric domains such as national security. It recognizes their substantial influence and establishes the theoretical foundations
and classifications of NSAs as a robust framework for comprehending their multifaceted roles. It illuminates the dynamic interplay between NSAs, global governance, and non-traditional security threats. NSAs' influence and their significance in shaping international policies and addressing the ever-evolving challenges of the modern world are numerous. The case studies highlight how NSAs contribute to national security and address complex issues such as human trafficking, taxation policies, and migration diplomacy, underscoring the diverse and influential roles NSAs play in the contemporary global landscape. Therefore, policymakers must recognize NSAs in the contemporary global landscape, actively engaging and collaborating with them to address security challenges and broader global issues while fostering transparency and accountability through the development of regulatory frameworks. Future research should focus on exploring the specific mechanisms by which NSAs can enhance national security and global governance, especially in emerging security threats like cyber warfare and climate-related challenges, with a keen eye on the dynamics of NSA-state collaborations. As NSAs expand their influence, policymakers should adapt national security strategies, integrating their expertise and resources to address both traditional and non-traditional security threats, fostering partnerships, sharing intelligence, and leveraging NSA capabilities to comprehensively safeguard national interests.

References


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